

The Dropping of the Atomic Bombs and a Shadow of the War Crimes Issue

By Hitoshi Nagai

1. The Protest of the Japanese Government to the U.S.

On his return from the Potsdam Conference, then U.S. President Harry S. Truman made a radio speech on August 9, 1945, in which he explained to the American people the reasons for and significance of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The logic of saving the lives of American soldiers, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese military, and the abuse of prisoners of war by Japanese soldiers were given as reasons for the use of atomic bomb. Even immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima, we can find the germination of the logic justifying the atomic bombing.

As Truman was explaining the significance of the atomic bombing, the Japanese government was preparing a letter of protest to the U.S. government. On August 10, it was delivered to Washington through the Swiss government. In this protest, the Japanese government fiercely criticized the U.S. government for the atomic bombing, calling it a crime against international law and humanity, citing Articles 22 and 23 of the rules concerning the laws and customs of war on land signed at The Hague in 1907. The Japanese government also appealed to international opinion by explaining the intentions of the protest to the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, such a protest by the government was put under seal after the end of the war. What lay behind the situation? I would like to shed light on the root cause of it.

2. Logic to Offset the Atomic Bombings against the War Crimes Issue

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, reaffirmed its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and promised to implement the declaration faithfully. Japanese government offices and units of the army and navy destroyed or concealed official documents in anticipation of the imminent pursuit of war criminals, since paragraph 10 of the declaration had stipulated stern justice to "all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) soon began a full-scale investigation of war crimes, which caused some resentment within the Japanese government and military. This is evident to some extent in the document entitled "Concerning the U.S. investigation of American soldiers executed as a result of a decision taken by the wartime Japanese military tribunal (*Gunritsu Kaigi*), prepared by the Secretary of the Committee Dealing with Postwar Issues (*Shusen Shori [Kaigi]*)," one of the records released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is thought that military officials prepared this document probably at the beginning

of September 1945 for discussion at the Committee Dealing with Post-war Issues, the highest policy-making body in the Japanese government after the end of the war. Its focus was the case of some surviving crew members of the U.S. planes who were executed in accordance with the decisions of the wartime Japanese military tribunals. I would like to draw attention to a statement in this document, which offers a justification of the execution as a strategy to avoid a thorough investigation by the U.S. army: "If the U.S. blames us for the execution of that American pilots, Japan should emphasize at every opportunity that the U.S. should first and immediately be accused of war crimes for its indiscriminate bombings, especially the atomic bombings, as a means of forestalling a unilateral investigation conducted solely by the U.S."

Reading between the lines of this document, one senses the tension among the officials concerned, who were on an extreme alert that things might develop into the prosecution of war criminals. As indicated in the comment given by an official of the army "This is not meant to be a protest to be lodged with them, but rather to prepare ourselves" the atomic bombing issue was not intended as an immediate negotiating card by the Japanese government. Still, it is interesting that the atomic bombings should be conceived of as a potential bargaining chip in dealing with the war crimes issue and in blocking U.S. investigations. We can clearly see a Japanese eagerness to thwart unilateral U.S. finger pointing by treating the atomic bombings as a war crime and raising it as an issue to offset Japanese responsibility for their own war crimes. But there was another comment, probably written by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It reads: "We should not try to offset the issue of the atomic bombings against the war crimes issue. We will lose our dignity by doing so." It suggests that there was an opinion current among policy-makers that questioned the wisdom of raising the atomic bombing issue as a counterbalance to Japanese war crimes.

The logic of offsetting the atomic bombings against Japanese war crimes was not a unique idea of the military staff. Indeed, it seems more likely to have derived from civilian government officials. Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister, sent a message to the Japanese legations in Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal on September 13, advising them to exploit the atomic bomb question to the utmost in their propaganda since the Americans were creating an uproar about Japanese mistreatment of prisoners. A U.S. military official in charge of intercepting and analyzing this secret telegram cast a keenly observant glance at Shigemitsu's statement and wrote in his report that the Japanese leaders intended to play up the atomic bombings to offset publicity about Japan's treatment of Allied prisoners of war and internees.

Similarly, the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, wrote to a reporter of the Associated Press: "People of America, won't you forget Pearl Harbor? We Japanese people will forget the picture of devastation wrought by the atomic bomb." This message was reported in the U.S. on September 15, and in Japan on the following day. Such an action of Prince Higashikuni also seems to have been an outgrowth of the same logic. In other words, during the early stage of the U.S. occupation of Japan, the illegality of the atomic bombings tended to be seen as a useful card for Japan to play to slow down the pursuit of war criminals by the Allies rather than as a problem in its own right. Statements by government officials at the time seem to reflect neither a deep understanding of the unprecedented catastrophe caused by the atomic bombs nor a deep concern for the citizens of the devastated cities. Rather, the offset logic highlights the fact that concerns about war crimes were growing among Japanese political leaders and for that reason the issue was regarded as a top priority on the political front. The situation was more serious for the way the war crimes problem impinged on the question of the postwar treatment of Emperor Hirohito.

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“Agreed Framework” Faces Imminent Revision

By Hajime Izumi

It has been eight years since the “Agreed Framework” was signed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America on October 21, 1994. Under this accord, Pyongyang pledged to freeze for the time being and eventually dismantle its existing nuclear-related facilities. In return, the United States agreed to take the lead in organizing a multinational consortium to build two safe, proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWRs; 1,000 MWe each) in North Korea. Thus, a quid pro quo agreement was concluded between North Korea and the international community.

Since then (or at least until December 2002), North Korea’s nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyong have been “frozen,” and the international community has implemented its commitment to build LWRs through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international consortium established in 1995, while delivering 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to North Korea. It can thus be said that, for the past eight years, we have been free from the imminent threat of North Korean nuclear weapon development. This is because the commitment made in the Agreed Framework prevented North Korea from mass-producing weapons-grade plutonium.

However, circumstances have significantly changed since the fall of 2002. When James A. Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited Pyongyang in October as an envoy, North Korea admitted that it was pursuing a program to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

The international community was astonished at North Korea’s “acknowledgement” that a uranium enrichment program was under way and strongly urged it to promptly eliminate that program in a visible and verifiable manner. In November 2002, the KEDO Executive Board made a statement condemning North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as a clear and serious violation of its obligations under the Agreed Framework. The KEDO Executive Board also decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries beginning with the December shipment as a punishment for the North’s secret nuclear program (as a result, delivery of approximately 60,000 tons of the 500,000 tons of heavy oil assigned to be shipped to North Korea in 2002 was suspended).

However, North Korea did not change its attitude, but took an even more defiant stance, threatening to “unfreeze” its nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyong in December 2002 on the pretext of alleviating energy shortages worsened by the suspension of the heavy oil deliveries. Furthermore, North Korea announced in January 2003 that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the second time it has done so in the past 10 years.

Such a series of commitment violations by North Korea has significantly impaired the effectiveness of the Agreed Framework. It would now seem difficult to maintain the present Agreed Framework, even if North Korea dismantles its uranium enrichment program, re-freezes its nuclear-related facilities, and takes back its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT. In such a case, it would be necessary to make amendments to

the Agreed Framework or to conclude a completely new treaty.

Particularly regarding the LWR construction project promoted by KEDO, given the current atmosphere in the United States, it has become extremely difficult to carry out the construction of the “Korean standard-model” reactors. We should now recognize that these reactors will not be completed without the participation of U.S. companies. If the U.S. government does not conclude a nuclear power agreement with the DPRK, the Korean standard-model LWRs will never function as atomic reactors, even though the South Korean government continues to cover most of the construction costs and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) continues to undertake the construction work.

Therefore, we need to consider other alternatives in case North Korea makes some concessions. Possible alternatives include: 1) providing a conventional thermal power plant instead of the two LWRs; 2) continuing the construction of one of the LWRs, but replacing the other with a thermal power plant; and 3) continuing construction of one of the LWRs, but stopping construction of the other and developing North Korea’s power grid instead.

As the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, clearly stated, alternative plan 1), described above, has been under discussion in the United States. The opinion that electric power demand in North Korea should be met not by nuclear power but by conventional power generation has become dominant in Washington. North Korea, which has so far brought about two nuclear crises and twice declared its withdrawal from the NPT, is regarded as having virtually renounced its right to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

On the other hand, South Korea regards the construction of LWRs as a “project transcending the national border (38th parallel),” and does not look favorably on alternative plan 1). This is because, if the LWRs are built, approximately 80% of the entire construction cost will be paid to South Korean construction companies. However, if a conventional thermal power plant is constructed, it will increase the chance for companies in other countries to participate in the construction work, resulting in lower profits for South Korean companies. It is hard to imagine that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would willingly accept a framework in which, while construction of the thermal plant is undertaken by companies from other countries, it would continue to shoulder 70% of the total construction costs. For this reason, South Korea seems to favor adopting alternative plan 3), outlined above.

As a result, it will be extremely difficult to secure coordination between the United States and South Korea regarding this issue. Given such a situation, Japan must immediately determine what position it will take toward the North Korean issue. To this end, we should first begin by raising awareness and interest among the general public in order to promote lively discussions on this matter.

Izumi is professor at University of Shizuoka

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3. Conclusion

On October 24, 1945, the U.S. government responded to the letter of protest the Japanese government had presented immediately after the atomic bombing. The reply in effect ignored the Japanese protest since it did not contain any opinion of the U.S. government about the subject of the Japanese protest, but simply acknowledged the receipt of it. Since that time, the Japanese government has neither iterated the charges against the U.S. government nor dared to appeal to world opinion. As a result, it has never been clearly stated as an official Japanese government view that the atomic bombings were a violation of international law. The huge gap between the statement issued by the Japanese government and those made by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki regarding the legitimacy

of the use of nuclear weapons at the International Court of Justice at The Hague in November 1995 is still fresh in our memory. It is quite possible that the firm attitude of GHQ, typified by its control of the press, caused Japan to shrink back and led to its decision not to further pursue its case about the illegality of the use of the atomic bombs. However, it cannot be denied that the way the issue was framed at an early stage of the U.S. occupation, namely, the recourse to the logic of offsetting the atomic bombing issue against the war crimes issue, severely limited policy options thereafter.

Nagai is research associate at HPI

about North Korea

Pyongyang Nuclear Puzzle

By Gavan McCormack

Crisis looms again in Korea. In December Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared U.S. readiness to fight wars on two fronts (meaning Iraq and North Korea), confident of “winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other.” Steps to refer the disputed nuclear issues to the U.N. Security Council were foreshadowed and the possibility of sanctions, intrusive inspections, and an “Iraq scenario” loomed. On New Year’s Day, President Bush made efforts to talk the situation down, but the standoff continues. North Korea’s nuclear designs remain shrouded in mystery, while its political isolation and economic crisis deepen.

The previous crisis, in 1994, went to the very brink of war. It was settled by the Jimmy Carter mission and a subsequent agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, known as the Geneva Agreed Framework. North Korea shelved its graphite nuclear reactor plans in return for an American proposal to construct light water reactors to generate 2,000 MW of electricity by a target date of 2003 and to supply 500,000 tons per year of heavy oil for energy generation in the interim. Other clauses committed the two parties to “move towards full normalization of political and economic relations” [Article 2] and the U.S. to provide “formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States” [Article 3].

Nine years have passed. There are no light-water reactors. In fact, there is nothing much but a large hole in the ground and no prospect of any power generation till around the end of this decade. And, far from any progress towards the normalization of political and economic relations, George W. Bush at the outset of his presidency called North Korea part of an “axis of evil,” and in place of “formal assurances,” talked of a preemptive attack and indicated a willingness to use nuclear weapons as part of it.

If, therefore, Pyongyang has plainly departed from the Agreed Framework, it did so after the agreement had already been substantially voided by the U.S., in respect of the reactor commitment, the promised normalization and the nuclear guarantee. Its earliest breach seems to have been the purchase of centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, probably from Pakistan, in the late 1990s. Possession of this technology, but not its use, was admitted in October 2002. The steps in December towards restarting the graphite reactors were even more plainly reactive. However, there is nothing to indicate that either technology is operating yet.

In 2000, following the William Perry report, there was a brief honeymoon in North Korea’s relationship with the U.S. The Kumchangri site, suspected of secret nuclear weapon development, was investigated and found to be “clean.” Washington developed a grudging respect for Pyongyang, top-level visits were exchanged and normalization seemed to be possible. A Pyongyang visit by Clinton did not eventuate, however, because time ran out, and under George W. Bush the clock was turned back. The Agreed Framework became a Clinton mistake, something to be voided and then scrapped. Pyongyang’s current threats to enrich uranium and moves to restart the plutonium-producing reactors are best seen as a desperate ploy to try to bring Washington back to the conference table rather than as an incomprehensible threat to innocent neighbors.

North Korea’s real uniqueness in the nuclear age is in its having lived under the shadow of nuclear threat for longer than any other nation, from the Korean War when General MacArthur had to be restrained from his

plan to drop “between 30 and 50 atomic bombs” and lay a belt of radioactive cobalt across the neck of the Korean peninsula, through the long Cold War, when the U.S. introduced nuclear artillery, mines, and missiles into Korea to intimidate the non-nuclear North, and after it, when rehearsals continued for a long-range nuclear bombing strike. After facing the threat of extermination for half a century, it would be surprising if North Korea did not now show signs of neurosis and instability.

The people who best know North Korea are the people of South Korea. There, in late 2002 the anger that was bringing large crowds into the streets was directed not against North Korea but against America. Gallup polls show nearly 60% of Koreans in the South no longer believe that North Korea poses a security threat, and a majority also believe Pyongyang is “sincere in its efforts for reunification.” On 19 December, the election of 56-year old Roh Moo-hyun as president signified the rise of a post-Cold War generation and a new resolve to resist U.S. pressures. Roh insisted that he would not kowtow to Washington, he would not support the imposition of a deadline for Pyongyang’s compliance with international demands to end its nuclear program and, if necessary, he would “guarantee North Korea’s security.”

War against North Korea is virtually impossible if South Korea says No. Even in 1994, Clinton was shocked to find that South Korea under its then conservative administration would not commit a single soldier to the U.S. cause. As president from 1998, Kim Dae-jung concentrated on his “sunshine” policy of engaging Pyongyang on a broad range of economic and social issues. Meeting George W. Bush in February 2002, he reminded him of the 1994 Pentagon assessment that any war on the peninsula would be likely to cause casualties of astronomical proportions, including probably more American deaths than for the entire, decade-long Vietnam War. In Seoul in early December, Richard Armitage was disconcerted to find a government more interested in securing a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (so that it could discipline U.S. soldiers in Korea in future) than in any talk of war. Under President Roh, this “recalcitrance” is likely to intensify. His readiness to “guarantee North Korea’s security” suggested that in a showdown South Korea would be as likely to fight *with* Pyongyang as against it.

North Korea is easiest to represent as bizarre, incomprehensible, or “evil,” yet like all states it is the product of its history. In this case, one constructed first around the guerrilla bands that fought against Japan in the 1930s and their foundation myths, and then around its survival for a half century under the threat of extinction at the hands of the global superpower. Only when peace is reached with Japan and the U.S. can there be any prospect of the dissolution of such a “guerrilla state.” Today, drastic economic reforms, moves to open road and rail links with South Korea (and to join the trans-continental system), the growing network of economic cooperation being negotiated with South Korea and its apology to Japan over past misdeeds, all point to a will for change in Pyongyang. The indications are that it is no longer monolithic, and that powerful elements want to set aside the guerrilla model of secrecy, mobilization, absolute loyalty to the commander and priority to the military to pursue Perestroika (for which in 2001 the Korean word *kaegon* was coined). They want to come in from the cold.

McCormack is professor at Australian National University

New Challenges Posed by the International Criminal Court

By Ikuko Togo

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is scheduled to be established at The Hague in Holland by the Rome Statute, which came into effect on July 1, 2002. This article aims to provide a simple introduction to the new institution.

1. What is the ICC?

Crimes committed during war or conflict between states have in the past been tried by special *ad hoc* courts like the Nuremberg Tribunal, which tried Nazi war criminals after WW II, the Tokyo Tribunal, which investigated Japanese war crimes, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established in 1993 to try Serbian war criminals, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set up to investigate genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In the two earlier tribunals, the winners were obviously in the position of judging the losers. The last two tribunals were established by international agreement based upon the decisions of the United Nations Security Council. In principle, they seem fair, but judgements are not wholly free from the biased intentions of powerful states in the U.N. Security Council. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia targeted war crimes and genocide committed by Serbs, rather than by non-Serbs. In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the particular target of judgements was genocide committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi, although during the disturbances slaughter was committed by both sides. The ICC, on the other hand, is a permanent international judicial body with the authority to try individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The International Court of Justice, ICJ, established in 1946, is another permanent court with the power to adjudicate disputes among nations according to international law. However, its jurisdiction is limited to states.

2. Preparations for the Establishment of the ICC and Progress in the Ratification of the Rome Statute

Learning from the lessons of the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the post-Cold War period, representatives from 160 governments, international organizations and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) participated in the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in July 1998 and adopted the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." More than 70 states had ratified the Rome Statute by July 1, 2002, when the treaty came into effect. To date, 139 states have signed the agreement, and 88 of them had ratified it by January 31, 2003.

Although the U.S. was reluctant to approve the establishment of the ICC from the start, the Clinton administration signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2001. However, the present Bush administration issued an unprecedented declaration in May 2002 to the effect that it would nullify the U.S. signature out of fear that U.S. soldiers abroad might be held criminally responsible on political grounds. At present, among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, only France and the U.K. have ratified the statute. Russia has signed but not yet ratified the document, and China has not signed it. Japan has not signed either, on the pretext that it does not have a domestic law authorizing the extradition of a defendant.

3. What does the ICC Judge?

Massive violations of human rights and crimes against humanity are not only domestic issues in the countries concerned but are also of great concern to the international community since they constitute crimes against human-kind that transcend national borders. The ICC has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide (killing with the intent of destroying a national, ethnic, racial or religious group), crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible eviction of populations, torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, etc.), war crimes and crimes of aggression. However, this last type will not be subject to the ICC's jurisdiction until an international agreement is reached on the definitions of the crimes involved and the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction. Please refer to Article 5, 121, 123. The jurisdiction of the ICC is neither limited by time nor region. Moreover, it is not limited to crimes committed in wartime or in conflict, but its jurisdiction also extends to crimes committed in peacetime.

4. Limits and Potentialities of the ICC

The ICC is empowered to judge relevant crimes according to international humanitarian law, but the following problems should be noted.

First, although prosecution by the ICC is free from the statute of limitations, crimes committed before the establishment of the ICC cannot be prosecuted. Many crimes committed in the past are thus beyond its jurisdiction.

Second, prosecution is limited to crimes committed either by nationals of or within the territory of a state which has ratified the Rome Statute (referred to as state party in the Statute). However, in cases where the defendant is a national of a state party, where the crime is committed within the territory of a state party, where a member or members of a foreign military force commit a crime within the territory of a state party, or the U.N. Security Council refers a case to the court, the ICC may prosecute crimes involving a non-state party.

Third, the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of a criminal require the cooperation of a state party. The ICC is governed by a basic rule known as "the principle of complementarity," which authorizes the ICC to involve itself only in cases where national courts are unable to deal with a crime.

5. The ICC and the International Community

It was in light of the experiences in the two world wars fought in the 20th century, followed by a number of other tragic wars and conflicts that the international community decided to establish a permanent international criminal court. However, the efforts and cooperation of numerous NGOs around the world provided the actual driving force behind the movement to establish the ICC.

Whether or not the International Criminal Court will succeed in the 21st century depends critically on how many more states will ratify the Rome Statute and whether it proves capable of judging all cases brought before it fairly and impartially and without regard to the views and interests of the sovereign states.

Togo is assistant professor at HPI

First Research Workshop on “Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia”

On November 2 and 3, the first research workshop was held for the “Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia” project at the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

Prior to the workshop, each participant prepared a draft paper on the country assigned, focusing on the following discussion points:

- 1) What are the major and/or contending conceptualizations of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the country concerned?
- 2) By what policymaking processes are confidence-building measures designed and developed in the country concerned? How are they actually implemented?
- 3) How much priority is accorded to confidence-building measures in the national security policy of the country concerned? How are their effects assessed and evaluated by the respective government?

Participants engaged in active discussion of the above-mentioned questions in reference to each country and shared ideas on the issues affecting confidence-building measures in East Asia at present.

Clear differences emerged among the countries in the priority given to important security policies. Each country puts into operation CBMs based on its own conceptualization. Confidence-building in East Asia should not be narrowly defined as a reference to military measures, as it is customarily defined in European countries, but more broadly to include political and economic measures as well. “Confidence-Building Mechanism” is a new expression, it is a broad and comprehensive concept that need be clarified and developed in the course of this project.

It was agreed that each participant should prepare a final paper for the second workshop based on the discussion at the first workshop. The second workshop will be held in Tokyo on May 24 and 25.

Participants of the first workshop:

[Planning Committee]

Yoshihide Soeya, Professor, Dept. of Law, Keio University (Chairman); Akihiko Tanaka, Professor, the University of Tokyo; Seiichiro Takagi, Director, 2nd Research Dept., the National Institute for Defense Studies; Hajime Izumi, Professor, Dept. of International Relations, University of Shizuoka (absent); Ikuko Togo, Assistant Professor, HPI; Nobumasa Akiyama, Assistant Professor, HPI (observer)

[Project Members]

Mely Anthony, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Gennady Chufirin, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russia

Changsu Kim, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, South Korea

Fu-Kuo Liu, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Benjamin Self, Senior Associate, Henry Stimson Center, U.S.A.

Scott Snyder, Korea Representative, the Asia Foundation

Xu Xin, Associate Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, China

Akiko Fukushima, Head of Policy Research and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan (absent owing to research travel abroad)

By Ikuko Togo, assistant professor at HPI

HPI’s First Public Lecture Series

The Hiroshima Peace Institute ran its first public lecture series, comprising nine lectures, over the two months from early October to early December 2002. The lectures were held at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange every Wednesday evening, each for one and a half hours followed by a half hour of discussion. Unlike our irregularly-scheduled “Forum,” where a guest scholar is invited to present an academic paper for a predominately specialist audience working in the field of peace studies and/or activities, this lecture series aimed to present and explain the results of our research activities to the citizens of Hiroshima as plainly as possible. It was hoped that the people who attended this series would be able to utilize the knowledge they gained to develop their own ideas about peace issues.

The lectures were given under the general title of “Memories and the Future of Northeast Asia: Towards a Mutual Understanding of Asian People in the 21st Century.” One of the important purposes of these lectures was to clarify the modern history of Japan’s relationships with neighboring Asian nations, in particular with Korea and China, and to examine closely the kinds of international frictions caused by memory gaps about major historical events involving Japan and those neighboring nations. In other words, the series aimed not simply to trace the chronological details of major international events concerning these nations but to analyze the causes of important historical incidents such as the Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s colonization of Korea. This was followed by an examination of gaps in Japanese, Korean and Chinese interpretations of such events, in an attempt to explore ways to build peaceful relationships between these nations.

The relationships between Japan and South Korea and between Japan and China have recently improved considerably. In particular, Japan’s relationship with South Korea became more intimate as a result of their co-hosting of the World Cup in 2002. Yet, as demonstrated by the continuing controversy over school textbooks, ways of interpreting and memorizing historical events, in particular events related to the Asia-Pacific War, is still a cause for serious international frictions in this corner of Asia. Japan’s relationship with North Korea is also very tense, due to the abduction and nuclear missile issues. It was thus a timely and

worthwhile exercise to run this series of lectures to reconsider and discuss how historical events like the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s colonization of Korea and invasion of China still affect Japan’s current relationships with neighboring nations, and how we might overcome such problems.

This lecture series was very popular and attracted well over the 60 people who initially applied to attend. Heated discussion often took place during question time, and at the end of the series many participants requested that a similar lecture series be held in 2003. In order to meet this request, we are planning to run a new course later this year.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

Title and Lecturer

- No.1 Oct.9 “The Dispatch of Troops to the Korean Peninsula by Hideyoshi Toyotomi from a Korean Perspective.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
- No.2 Oct. 16 “The Sino-Japanese War and Yukichi Fukuzawa’s View of Asia.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
- No.3 Oct.23 “The Russo-Japanese War and Ryotaro Shiba’s Historical View.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
- No.4 Oct.30 “Anti-Japanese War: Gaps between Memories and Recognitions.” Lecturer: Masumi Matsumoto, associate professor at Keiwa College
- No.5 Nov.13 “What Is ‘The Responsibility after World War II’?: To Create Order of Peace in Northeast Asia.” Lecturer: Tetsuya Takahashi, associate professor at University of Tokyo
- No.6 Nov.20 “Various Aspects of the Treatment of Prisoners of War during World War II: A Comparative Study.” Lecturer: Hitoshi Nagai, research associate at HPI
- No.7 Nov.27 “The Past and the Present of the Comfort Women Issue Related to Nationalism.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
- No.8 Dec.4 “Memories of Hiroshima: Perceptions and Interpretations of the U.S., Asian Countries and Japan.” Lecturer: Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI
- No.9 Dec.11 “The Future of Northeast Asia: To Deepen Citizens’ Mutual Understanding.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

HPI Research Forum

July 9, 2002



Title: Non-Violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism

Speaker: Dr. Regine Mehl, Director of AFB-PRIUB, Peace Research Information Unit, Bonn

The questions Dr. Mehl raised could not be more relevant: “Did 11 September 2001 introduce a qualitatively new kind of terrorism?” “Didn’t we know that state terrorism and the private use of terrorism as a means to an end has a long history?” “Weren’t the terrorist attacks used by the U.S. as an occasion to realize its hidden agenda and to teach its allies how to use them for such a purpose?” Meanwhile, aggressive war drumming by the U.S. reveals that the hidden agenda again dominates world politics. Dr. Mehl took a deeper look into the relationship of state and civil society. She called for analysis of the atavistic U.S. regression into a “crusading mentality” against so-called “rogue states.” Indeed, there is need for a critical view of what the U.S. terms “security” and “constabulary duties” (Wolfowitz) mean to us and to those who may become its targets.

Almost silenced by the phony war drumming, nonviolent and civil alternatives are all but forgotten. Responses to terrorism need to take into account historical contexts and to be guided by intercultural understanding if they are to contribute to a solution. Dr. Mehl called for a cooperative partnership at eye level. The role of the media is especially important, yet most mass media failed to function as the independent powers they

should be in a democratic society. The participants found instead that U.S.-influenced media intensified the war drumming and behaved like tools of the U.S. quest for supremacy.

Fortunately, sub-state actors have not yet employed the most dangerous means: 9-11 took place without the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet, actually, some of the most dangerous means already used by sub-state actors have been WMD, as in the case of the Sarin gas attack by the Aum Sect in Japan. There are fears about dirty bombs and nuclear terrorism. These fears are justified, and the U.N. should lead the effort to prevent such threats.

The participants discussed evidence that bin Laden is a creation of the United States. (As analyzed by Ahmed Rashid, author of *Taliban and Jihad*, and others, Islamist terror was invented 25 years ago and financed by the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.) An answer to the question “What made al-Qaeda turn against its master?” might contribute significantly to an understanding of sub-state terrorism, but the U.S. seems unready to address this question. Participants also felt that, if an attempt were made to eliminate al-Qaeda, many other organizations would simply spring up to replace it. It is necessary to address the root causes of sub-state terrorism for instance, the Middle East conflict and U.S. blunders regarding the Israel-Palestine question, as well as its attempt to militarize the Middle Eastern region. For many people the “war on terrorism” appears rather to be a war against Islam.

By Christian P. Scherrer, professor at HPI

November 12, 2002



Title: State Terrorism and Human Rights; The United States, Japan and the Civilians in Twentieth Century Asian Wars

Speaker: Dr. Mark Selden, professor at the State University of New York, Binghamton

The underlying theme of Professor Selden’s paper was the question of how we should interpret terrorist acts such as that of September 11, 2001, the subsequent U.S. war in Afghanistan, a potential war against Iraq in the near future and other related occurrences. His comprehensive paper analyzed major wars in Asia involving the U.S. and Japan during the last century. This kind of broad historical examination is vital for understanding the fundamental nature of modern warfare and present military conflicts.

Selden employed two concepts “human rights” and “the civilian” as the key to a comprehensive and comparative analysis of different types of wars in Asia, including the Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War,

the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In response to the various military conflicts that occurred both in Asia and Europe during the 20th century, a world-wide effort was directed toward establishing international law and law enforcing organizations to protect basic human rights, notably those of civilians in wartime. Paradoxically, however, serious violations of human rights on an unprecedented scale in particular those of civilians have been committed by military forces. These have increased with the passage of time, changes in the nature of warfare, and technological advance. Moreover, such violations have increased not only in number, but also in degree.

Selden gave various examples of human rights violations in major wars in Asia to illuminate this paradoxical development. As quintessentially Japanese examples, he cited the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women system and the vivisectionist experiments conducted on humans by Unit 731 using biological and chemical agents. As similar examples committed by U.S. forces, he highlighted indiscriminate bombings using napalm, atomic bombs and “agent orange.” A concern to protect the human rights of civilians in war situations was evident at

the international war crimes courts established immediately after World War II. Yet, as Selden pointed out, there has been a continuity of indiscriminate bombings against civilians in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and more recently still in the war in Afghanistan. He defined such indiscriminate bombings by the U.S. as a type of “state terrorism.” He noted, further, the impunity with which the U.S. has been able to commit state terrorism in contrast, for example, to the experience of Germany and Japan at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.

During the discussion time, questions and comments by participants centered upon the gap between international law and the actual failure to

protect the rights of civilians. The concern expressed by those participants was quite natural because, since September 11, the U.S. government has issued new military and foreign guidelines which ignore the legacy of international law built upon the experience of wars and conflicts in the 20th century. Selden’s paper was especially stimulating at a time when concrete ideas were urgently needed to reduce the gap between law and practice and to find peaceful methods to resolve military conflicts.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI



December 16, 2002

Title: Scope and Limits of International Solidarity in the 1990s

Speaker: Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud, senior academic programme officer in the Peace and Governance Program, United Nations University in Tokyo

The main topic of Dr. Coicaud’s lecture was analysis of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in the 1990s. Lively discussion following the lecture centered on what was meant by solidarity, the question of political will and interplay between the United Nations and the major powers, especially the U.S.

In a review of criticisms of PKOs in the 1990s, Dr. Coicaud underlined the institutional limitations of the U.N. as a “headquarters organization.” According to Dr. Coicaud, three institutional limitations are at the core of the malfunctioning of the U.N. Secretariat and account for some of what went wrong in PKOs in the 1990s: (1) the U.N. is a headquarters organization, not a global organization, (2) there is a gap between the headquarters and the field, and (3) tension exists between diplomatic and bureaucratic culture, on the one hand, and operational and military culture, on the other. The headquarters (HQ) seem too preoccupied with themselves to make the world a priority, and the political logic of the headquarters prevails over operational needs in the field. Gaps between HQ and field are institutional in several aspects; e.g. the fact that field careers and headquarters careers are two totally different career tracks. Officers in the HQ have little knowledge of what the field is about.

The classic instance of the latter was the inability of General Dallaire in Rwanda to convince the HQ in spring 1994 that massive killings were about to happen, and again, in April 1994, that genocide was taking place and something had to be done to stop it. Participants saw this example as proof of the destructive great power interference of France, which was in complicity with the génocidaires, as well as of the U.S., which blocked every response.

Participants asked what was meant by solidarity and between whom, referred to trouble with certain member states and also mentioned Brahimi’s reform package to improve PKOs. It was suggested that not all that went wrong in the PKOs of the 1990s had to do with U.N. pathologies. As for the self-generated limitations of the U.N. Secretariat,

the U.N. has made a major effort to address them: the Brahimi report and subsequent implementation reports by the U.N. do address technical limitations of the Secretariat and formulate institutional solutions.

The lack of political will among key member states revealed itself in the reluctance of some permanent members of the Security Council to engage internationally in addressing the humanitarian crises of the past 10 years and in their limited commitment in the search for solutions. The new context in the aftermath of the Cold War brought a measure of change to key aspects of international affairs in the 1990s. There was a redistribution of political power mainly toward the U.S. There was also a new incentive to extend a sense of international solidarity to the areas in crisis. Participants voiced the opinion that in practice there was too much ethnocentrism and racial bias guiding the U.N. The priority of the national over the international surfaced as vested interests.

Participants debated that while on the surface much of the 1980s and 1990s was dominated by the human rights rhetoric of the Western powers, the U.S. struggle for supremacy all but turned this upside down. It was mentioned that in all wars initiated by Western powers since 1945, especially those begun by the U.S., civilian populations were the prime targets; e.g. the bombing of many countries, among them Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and, more recently, Panama 1989, Iraq 1991, Yugoslavia 1999 and Afghanistan 2001-2. Another pattern was U.S.-supported attacks by client regimes on their own populations or neighbouring states, as in Indonesia 1965, Chile 1973, and East Timor 1975/76, to name only the deadliest instances.

U.S. concerns influencing PKOs include the zero casualty and “Force Protection” policy (no body bags coming home), which have priority over the protection of civilians. As of today, the U.S. abstains almost completely from all PKOs. Today, the NATO force in tiny Kosovo is larger than the total number of peacekeepers in the rest of the world!

In the past media reports made it difficult for major powers to shy away from humanitarian crises. Participants mentioned that media independence will become problematic in the future with major powers trying to control the global flow of information or even censoring by denial of access, as the U.S. did before the October 2001 attack on Afghanistan.

By Christian P. Scherrer, professor at HPI

Hello from HPI



Hiroko Takahashi Research Associate

Hiroko Takahashi was born in Nishinomiya, Hyogo Prefecture. She specializes in American history. She studied at Doshisha University, and graduated from the Master's Degree Program of the Department of Cultural History, the Faculty of Letters, Doshisha University Graduate School (Master of Letters). She then studied at the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, mainly at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, where she collected documents concerned with the atomic bombs and nuclear tests.

Takahashi states: "Documents concerned with the atomic bombs (especially those containing medical information) were strictly controlled by the U.S. government throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s. Documents on the *Hibakusha* casualties caused by U.S. nuclear tests only began to be declassified in the 1990s. Here in Hiroshima, taking these historical facts into consideration, I would like to consider how to share this important information with the rest of the world and to communicate it to future generations."



Dr. Wade Huntley Associate Professor

Wade Huntley specializes in international security, nuclear arms control, and Asia-Pacific political relations. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, and directed the Peace and Security Program at the Nautilus Institute located in the same city. He also served as a Research Associate with the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

Dr. Huntley states: "I am very excited by the opportunity to join HPI, and I intend to develop several types of projects. First, I will undertake policy-relevant research to increase knowledge and broaden understanding about current U.S. strategic policy and its effects in East Asia. Second, I will investigate how domestic democratization can support international peace. Third, I will work to build partnerships between the Hiroshima Peace Institute and other organizations in the United States and elsewhere in the world. With these endeavors I hope to help my colleagues increase the effectiveness and visibility of HPI throughout the world."

DIARY

October 30, 2002 - February 28, 2003

Oct. 30 The HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City is held at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange. Masumi Matsumoto, associate professor at Keiwa College, gives a lecture on "Anti-Japanese War: Gaps between Memories and Recognitions."

Oct. 31-Nov. 1 Nobumasa Akiyama attends the U.S.-Japan Track II Meeting on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verification held in Tokyo and reports on "Japan's Approach toward Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction."

Nov. 2-3 The first workshop of the HPI Research Project on "Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia" is held at HPI.

Nov. 8 Kazumi Mizumoto attends as a committee member the Peace Policy Promotion Network Meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee and held at Chugoku Regional Research Center.

Nov. 9 Mizumoto gives a lecture on "Criminal Reports in the Press in Japan and the U.S.: Comparison Based on Two Actual Cases" at the 30th anniversary symposium of the Chushikoku Association for American Studies held at Hiroshima University.

Nov. 10 Yuki Tanaka and Hitoshi Nagai attend the semiannual conference of the Peace Studies Association of Japan held at Shudo University and Tanaka gives a presentation on "To Face the Reality of Japanese War Crimes."

Nov. 11-13 Christian P. Scherrer attends the International Conference on Post-Conflict Reconstruction held in Hiroshima by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Hiroshima Prefectural Government and submits a paper titled "Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Challenges, Framework, Priorities."

Nov. 12 Mark Selden, professor at the State University of New York, gives a lecture on "State Terrorism and Human Rights: The United States, Japan and the Civilians in Twentieth Century Asian Wars" at the HPI Research Forum.

Nov. 13 The HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City is held at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange. Tetsuya Takahashi, associate professor at the University of Tokyo, gives a lecture on "What Is 'The Responsibility after World War II': To Create Order of Peace in Northeast Asia."

Nov. 14-15 Akiyama attends a workshop on "Humanitarian Challenges in Complex Emergencies" held in Kobe by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Nov. 15-17 Ikuo Togo attends the annual research meeting of the Japan Association of International Relations held in Hyogo Prefecture.

Nov. 20 Nagai gives a lecture on "Various Aspects of the Treatment of Prisoners of War during World War II: A Comparative Study" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

Nov. 22 Mizumoto attends the 3rd working group meeting on "Hiroshima Global Peace Plan" held at Japan Institute of International Affairs under the co-sponsorship of Hiroshima Prefecture and Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Nov. 24 HPI President Haruhiro Fukui gives a lecture titled "On Human Beings" at Hiroshima University of Economics.

Nov. 27 Tanaka gives a lecture on "The Past and the Present of the Comfort Women Issue Related to Nationalism" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

Nov. 29 Mizumoto gives a presentation on "The Diversity of Interpretations and Perceptions in Japan, U.S., China and Korea of the A-bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" at Hitotsubashi University research meeting on the "Memories of Wars and the International Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region," held at Josuikaikan in Tokyo.

Dec. 1 Scherrer gives a presentation on the use of depleted uranium weapons titled "Threats against Iraq, Acts of State Terrorism and New Arms Race" at a panel discussion meeting at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Dec. 4 Mizumoto gives a lecture on "Memories of Hiroshima: Perceptions and Interpretations of the U.S., Asian Countries and Japan" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

Dec. 7 Tanaka gives a presentation on "Crimes against Humanity: Perspectives towards Revitalizing the Spirit of Hiroshima" at the 22nd International Symposium on "Japan's Justice: Domestic and International Dimensions" organized by International Christian University Social Science Research Institute and the Institute for the Study of Social Justice of Sophia University and held in Tokyo.

Dec. 11 Tanaka gives a lecture on "The Future of Northeast Asia: To Deepen Citizens' Mutual Understanding" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

Dec. 12 Akiyama attends a workshop of the Asia Europe Forum for Young Professionals held in Tokyo.

Dec. 16 Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud, senior academic programme officer in the Peace and Governance Program at the United Nations University in Tokyo, gives a lecture on "Scope and Limits of International Solidarity in the 1990s" at the HPI Research Forum. Mizumoto attends the 4th working group meeting on "Hiroshima Global Peace Plan" held at Japan Institute of International Affairs under the co-sponsorship of Hiroshima Prefecture and Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Dec. 20 Akiyama attends a meeting in Tokyo of the Research Group on Human Resource Development in the Field of Disarmament of Conventional Weapons sponsored by Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Jan. 5-11 Mizumoto visits Cambodia to participate in the research program on "Reconstruction Assistance in the Post-Conflict Regions" implemented by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee.

Jan. 18 Mizumoto gives a lecture on "The Situation of Nuclear Weapons after September 11" at the 8th session of the Hiroshima Peace Forum co-organized by Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation and held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Jan. 20-21 Akiyama attends a steering committee meeting and congress on "Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for Global Partnership" held in London by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Feb. 1 Mizumoto gives a lecture on "Current Issues of the Rehabilitation of Cambodia: Tasks of Post-Civil War Society" at the Department of Human Environment of Hiroshima International University.

Feb. 2 The second workshop of the HPI Research Project "Military Violence against Civilians: A Comparative and Historical Analysis" is held at HPI.

Feb. 7 Mizumoto gives a presentation on "Hiroshima's New Peace Policy and the Issues of Reconstruction in Conflict Regions" at the symposium of the Round-Table Conference of International Education sponsored by Hiroshima Prefecture, Hiroshima University and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and held at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.

Feb. 7-9 Tanaka gives a presentation on "Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery, Social Death and Military Violence" at the workshop on comfort women issues sponsored by the Asia Women's Fund Foundation and held in Hakone.

Feb. 11 Mizumoto gives a lecture on "The Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons" at the 8th training course of the Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Feb. 12 Akiyama visits Washington D.C. to attend the workshop on "Japan's Nuclear Policy" held by the Henry L. Stimson Center. Mizumoto attends as a committee member the Peace Policy Promotion Network Meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee and held at Chugoku Regional Research Center.

Feb. 15 Togo attends a meeting of the Research Committee of South-North Sharing Campaign for Peace & Reunification of Korea in Seoul.

Feb. 23 Mizumoto gives a presentation on "The Responsibility of Hiroshima in the Century of Peace and Humanity" at the 9th session of the "Hiroshima Peace Forum" held at Hiroshima Aster Plaza.

Feb. 24-25 HPI and Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) hold a workshop on "Resolution and Prevention of Conflicts and the Role of Civil Society."

Feb. 28 Ian Maddocks, Emeritus Professor at Flinders University, gives a lecture on "Anti-Personnel Land Mines: a Model of Modern Military Practice, and a Challenge for Peace Activists" at the HPI Research Forum.

Visitors to HPI

Nov. 19 Dr. David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Nov. 27 Dr. Kathleen Sullivan, Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Education and Action Project at Educators for Social Responsibility Metropolitan Area, New York, U.S.A.

Jan. 31 Dr. Gerd-Helge Vogel of Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University, Caspar-David-Friedrich Institute, Greifswald, Germany.

Feb. 21 Toshinori Shigeie, Senior Research Fellow, Akira Shimotori, Project Coordinator, and Dashdorj Bayarkhuu, Sisavath Inphachanh, Tara Kartha, Yin Myo Thu, Visiting Research Fellows of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Feb. 25 Dr. Jun Nishikawa, professor of Economic Development, Waseda University.

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