

The Current Situation and Japan's Role Discussed at HPI Symposium

Little progress in nuclear disarmament after unequivocal undertaking

HPI hosted an international symposium titled "Where does the 'unequivocal undertaking' stand?: The current situation and Japan's responsibilities in eliminating nuclear weapons" on July 28th at the Hiroshima International Conference Center. Despite the adoption by all parties, including nuclear weapon states, of an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons at the 2000 NPT review conference, little progress has been made. In addition, the missile defense program of the Bush administration has further complicated the international community's approach to nuclear issues. The Hiroshima symposium was intended to shed light on the current situation and to facilitate articulation of opinions on Japan's role.

Among the panelists was Mitsuru Kurosawa, a professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and head of HPI's nuclear disarmament in the 21st century project. Five foreign experts, who will contribute to the project's final report to be released next spring, attended as guest panelists.

In the first session, which dealt with the roles and responsibilities of the United States and Russia, Lawrence Scheinman explained research conducted recently by the Bush administration. The research concluded that the United States might need an even stronger nuclear capability if the already uncertain strategic environment deteriorates. The report recommended that Washington should not sign any agreement that obliges it to abandon its right to restore nuclear weapons to original levels after cuts have been made.

Roland Timerbaev said coordinated reductions in nuclear weapons among all nuclear weapon states were most desirable, but acknowledged that coordinated unilateral cuts by the United States and Russia were more likely. He proposed strategic nuclear reductions by the five nuclear states to a total of 4,000 warheads over the next seven years, a suggestion already made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Later, Tariq Rauf pointed out that the multilateral framework of non-proliferation, maintained over the 50 years or so since the end of the war, had been endangered by the unilateralist stance of the current U.S. administration, particularly its plans for missile defense. He said the time had come for U.S. allies to put pressure on Washington to re-examine its policies.

In the second session, titled "Advocates of nuclear disarmament and Japan," Darach MacFhionnbhairr said the obligation of the nuclear states to disarm, stated in Article 6 of the NPT, had been further clarified at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. By the same token, he added, non-nuclear states had a duty to reject any moves designed to enable nuclear states to renege on their promise. Non-nuclear states, he said, should do all they could to ensure that this "unequivocal undertaking" was not consigned to the historical scrap heap.

Finally, Rebecca Johnson urged the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister to take the lead in bringing about the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Japanese people, she said, should make their voices heard at the grass-roots, local, national and international levels. She advised them to make full use of the media and other democratic tools to put pressure on nuclear weapon states, and on Japanese and U.S. officials.

Each session featured an hour-long question-and-answer session involving panelists and members of the 200-strong audience. HPI published a report on the symposium in November 2001.

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

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The Global Nuclear Situation and Japan's Tasks

By Mitsuru Kurosawa



No progress has been made since nuclear weapon states made an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Not surprisingly, the symposium "Where does the 'unequivocal undertaking' stand?" focused on what we can do to prompt those states to make good on their commitments. As experts from the United States, Russia and Canada pointed out, the most pressing issue is the Bush administration's plans for missile defense.

First, let us consider the "renewed threat" to which Washington refers to justify missile defense; the system's technical feasibility and costs; and its possible ramifications for international politics. Supporters of missile defense claim the moral high ground, pointing to the system's defensive, as opposed to offensive, nature. But one of the greatest concerns is that the United States is pursuing missile defense unilaterally with no consultation with other states.

Washington's unilateralism is also evident in its decision neither to ratify the CTBT nor to endorse controls on small arms, and its refusal to take part in negotiations on fissile material cut-off (FMTC). Instead, the United States appears determined to make decisions free of interference from other states, and to decrease its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. That approach, however, also leaves open the possibility that it will later restore its nuclear stockpile to previous levels. Pressure must be applied at home and from overseas, and Japan has a duty to object to U.S. policy where necessary.

Japan's role was discussed in the second half of the symposium. While it is too weak to negotiate alone on equal terms with its much more powerful ally, Japan could achieve breakthroughs if it negotiates with the United States as part of a group of nations. The political conditions, though, are not ripe for cooperation with members of the New Agenda Coalition. I have proposed that Japan, Australia and Canada (JAC), all U.S. allies, should come together to negotiate with the United States. Canada's devotion to nuclear disarmament is stronger than Japan's, and Australia is a signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. In addition, the so-called NATO5, which comprises Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Italy, has urged the United States to reconsider its policy on the first use of nuclear weapons. JAC and the NATO5 could achieve a great deal if they pooled their diplomatic resources and enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament.

In addition to the important role played by Japan's Foreign Ministry, attention should focus on the policy-making role of the national Diet. For example, the Foreign Ministry initially opposed a total ban on anti-personnel landmines, but changed its mind after then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi threw his weight behind the treaty. Obuchi had come under pressure from Diet members and NGOs. To achieve nuclear disarmament, Diet members must apply pressure on the prime minister and foreign minister to reflect their views in foreign policy. By the same token, it is up to the voters to remind their representatives of the need to make progress on disarmament as frequently and as vocally as possible.

Kurosawa is professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University



Participants

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Nuclear Disarmament: Issues and Prospects for the United States

At this time the policy of the new U.S. administration is still in the process of being defined. Among other things, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review are still in process. In addition, there is scope for domestic and international political factors to enter into the policy equation. For example, the unexpected shift in control of the U.S. Senate from Republican to Democratic as a result of Senator Jeffords leaving the Republican Party to become an Independent has given rise to skepticism over the Bush administration’s disposition to put greater emphasis on unilateral approaches to security policy rather than on multilateral arrangements which it sees as a constraint on pursuing the country’s national interest.



Lawrence Scheinman

The unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament concurred in by the United States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference maintains continuity with past administrations and is consistent with the Bush administration’s view favoring reductions in strategic weapons even if on a unilateral as opposed to formal negotiated basis. The question is less whether the elimination of nuclear weapons should be an objective but rather when and how and under what circumstances. Context is extremely important in that if the security system, which is dependent on nuclear deterrence, is to be eliminated, it must be in circumstances in which it is replaced with an alternative structure that satisfies national security and meets the international community’s need to be able to counter aggression. In short, if one wants to build down a security system, one must simultaneously build up a credible and reliable alternative system.

A recent study by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in which a number of persons now serving in the Bush administration participated, emphasized the continued importance of nuclear deterrence and, given the uncertainties about stability or instability in the security environment, the consequent need to maintain a capability to support deterrence objectives. This would, of course, mean the legal and political right to build new weapons, if deemed appropriate by strategic and foreign policy requirements. That study concluded that reductions should be determined and carried out unilaterally and not be the subject of formal negotiations which would deprive the United States of the freedom to adjust the size of its nuclear forces in keeping with changes in the strategic environment.

Unilateral initiatives, while useful means of getting a process going and making progress in the relatively short term, also have a downside; they are not legally binding, they are reversible, and they would not normally involve meaningful verification arrangements. Those three factors, however, are important to long-term predictability and stability. The United States should look to a mix of approaches, using unilateral measures to jump start the process of reducing nuclear weapons and their relevance while engaging in multilateral negotiations to lock in agreements that can be reached.

The situation we face today is similar to that of 1945 when the United States was capable of influencing the entire world. Now, as in the period 1945-1957, the United States should invest its energy in multinational regimes and supporting institutions consistent with national interests that control weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and in security arrangements that hold out the promise for stability of the international order.

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Global Nuclear Problems: The Future of Multilateral Arms Control

The end of the Cold War has given us the opportunity to dramatically reduce nuclear weapons and strengthen multilateral frameworks. The following three points may be of use to citizens who are attempting to persuade their governments to take steps to ensure a secure future for us all.



Tariq Rauf

First, Washington is likely to try to act outside the constraints imposed by multilateral treaties and regimes to promote more than non-proliferation and the abolition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. For the past 50 years, the international community has striven to build and maintain a multilateral framework designed to ensure stability and predictability. But the postwar premise that international treaties enhance security ended with the advent of the new U.S. administration. The Bush administration’s arms control policies and programs are unlikely to pursue traditional methods of arms control, but to create conditions that will allow the United States to act unilaterally in its own interests. Regarding the 2000 NPT Review Conference, for example, the U.S. has not said it is unequivocally committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The second point relates to missile defense. The end of deterrence as promoted by mutually assured destruction (MAD) requires nothing less than

Dealing with Nuclear Issues: Russia’s Perspective

We in Russia are very concerned about the status and future of arms control and nuclear disarmament. Even though we had quite a few success stories at the beginning of the 1990s, there were several negative developments in the closing years of the decade, such as the continuing impasse on the Russian-U.S. strategic dialogue, U.S. plans to go ahead with missile defense, and the failure to enforce the START II and the CTBT.



Roland Timerbaev

The world is undergoing a transition from a Cold War system based on two opposing, and excessively armed, superpowers, toward one with a new framework.

Given the pauses in the bilateral Russia-U.S. talks and the multilateral Geneva conference on disarmament, the hiatus in the nuclear arms control negotiation process is bound to continue for some time. What will be done during this pause? I think one should consider the possibility of coordinated unilateral steps to downsize the number of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, which has already been suggested by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Preferably, such steps should be combined with confidence-building measures and other voluntary arrangements to improve transparency.

Putin suggested to French President Jacques Chirac during his recent visit to Russia that the five officially recognized nuclear weapon states, which are also permanent members of the UN Security Council, begin multilateral talks on strategic stability. Russia favors negotiating the reduction, with international verification, of the five’s strategic warheads from the present 14,000 to 4,000 – with Russia and U.S. cutting down to 1,500 or less – over the next seven years.

While welcoming this suggestion, I would rather see the inclusion in the negotiating process or consultations, whatever form they take, of not only the official nuclear weapon states but also the other three states that have nuclear explosive devices – India, Pakistan and Israel – as well as other states with advanced nuclear capabilities, such as Japan and Germany. As things stand, I do not believe that any formal and verifiable agreement can be achieved any time soon.

A solution along the lines of coordinated unilateral reductions is more likely, so I am very much in favor of internationalizing the process of nuclear disarmament.

One of the most serious problems we face is the problem of the entry into force of the CTBT. The U.S., China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and some other states have yet to ratify it. Alarming media reports claim that the U.S. is preparing to abandon test moratoriums and resume testing. If these tests do indeed go ahead, they will signal the end of the moratoriums, which are currently adhered to by all states capable of experimenting with or exploding nuclear devices.

Despite these negative developments, I do not wish to appear too pessimistic. There are, for example, signs that Putin and Bush, who established good working relations in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June and in Genoa, Italy, in July, have agreed to speed up consultations. Let’s hope that these consultations bring about results. I have my doubts, but I still hold out hope.

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the abolition of nuclear weapons. But this is not what the Bush administration is trying to do. In fact, nuclear deterrence will be with us as long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States has said that a missile defense system incorporating a robust nuclear offensive capability will create a world that no longer has to rely on MAD to keep the peace. The United States is trying to convince its allies that, by deploying missile defense, it will remove the shadow of MAD. However, missile defense will make the world less safe if China, as many expect, responds by increasing its nuclear arsenal and Russia feels it has no option but to build new multiple warhead systems.

Third, it is the responsibility of U.S. allies to influence Washington as it engages in policy reviews, not to wait until the results of these reviews emerge. They should also remind Washington of its obligation to implement the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to take steps toward nuclear disarmament it agreed to at the NPT Review Conference. I urge U.S. allies to highlight the dangers of moving away from multilaterally negotiated treaties toward unilateralism.

Arms control negotiations, now in their 15th year, have not finished yet. World leaders with ties to the United States should use every opportunity to counter the unilateralist message U.S. officials are taking to their capital cities.

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The Role of Non-nuclear Weapon States in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament



Darach MacFhionnbhairr

The challenge of nuclear disarmament has been an issue between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states ever since the use of the atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When Ireland tabled the resolution at the United Nations in 1958, which launched the process that resulted in the NPT 10 years later, the role of the non-nuclear weapon states in driving the nuclear disarmament agenda was already well established. The NPT partnership enabled the non-nuclear weapon states to address the weapon states on their legal treaty obligations and to demand the prize of early nuclear disarmament.

The end of the Cold War altered the entire context in which nuclear weapons and their elimination could be considered. The moratoria on nuclear testing and the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996 represented a high watermark. However, by the mid-1990s, the pace of nuclear disarmament had faltered. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was created in response to the unwillingness of the weapon states to proceed with the disarmament that they had always promised once the Cold War had ended.

Preoccupied at the lack of resolve by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear weapons, Ireland, together with its New Agenda partners, joined together to examine how our governments might more effectively address that complacency and reverse the ineffectiveness of the non-nuclear weapon states' advocacy of nuclear disarmament, which had left the nuclear weapon states unchallenged in their restatement of the role of nuclear weapons in their defense postures and policies.

The New Agenda called first and foremost for an unequivocal commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. With this undertaking as a starting point, and agreement on a realistic

programme of action, nuclear disarmament could become a realizable goal. And because this goal would take some time to achieve, certain interim measures could be undertaken to lessen the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in the period leading to their elimination. Such interim measures were already being advocated by some NATO states in the run-up to the strategic concept to be adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999.

During negotiations with the New Agenda at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states finally committed themselves unequivocally to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons as proposed by the New Agenda. The Final Document of the 2000 Review contains a comprehensive programme of action for nuclear disarmament, including the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral elements required to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, it includes steps to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, to minimize the chances of these weapons ever being used and facilitate the process of their elimination, to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons, and to tackle the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.

The unequivocal commitment ends the ambiguity that nuclear weapon states have, over the years, read into Article VI of the NPT. The new political commitment requires them to pursue nuclear disarmament without equivocation. The non-nuclear weapon states must, therefore, insist that this fundamental step is the measure by which all steps involving nuclear weapons will henceforth be judged.

We must continue to press nuclear weapon states so that our recent achievements will not quickly be consigned to history. Civil society, too, will have to be more active than ever to ensure their implementation. This is our last and best chance to reverse and eradicate the scourge of nuclear weapons, to which Hiroshima is a witness and warning to us all.

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The Role of Civil Society in Nuclear Disarmament



Rebecca Johnson

At the end of the Cold War, we believed governments would take nuclear disarmament into their own hands and start getting rid of their weapons. We know now that that was not to be the case. Now, more than ever, civil society, has to create the pressure, the conditions, the actions to make our governments recognize that we do not want to live under the threat of nuclear weapons. Nor do we want our countries to rely on nuclear weapons or be dependent as allies of nuclear weapons states.

Civil society can be proud of its achievements in several areas. Years of pressure for the CTBT and the INF Treaty was created by people desperate for change; not only nongovernmental organizations, but doctors, scientists, women, peace movements, city authorities led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, environmentalists, indigenous peoples and survivors of the atomic bombings.

Missile defence is put forward as a way of protecting the U.S. or others from weapons of mass destruction. If it were genuinely concerned about weapons of mass destruction (WMD), of which missile delivery is probably the least likely form, then a sensible WMD defence policy would encompass the following priorities, which would be far more useful than missile defence:

- 1) security and controls to deny access to the materials (plutonium etc.), i.e. fissile materials ban, no transport, more cooperative threat reduction programmes with Russia, better International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of stockpiles pending elimination etc.
- 2) control, reduction, and disarmament policies for missiles – although they can

carry conventional payloads and the technology is useful for shooting things into space, it is well understood that they are primarily intended to deliver WMD – something could be worked out for peaceful satellite launches.

- 3) public education about the dangers of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, including training emergency services and equipping medical facilities.
- 4) banning and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. This entails reinforcing and implementing the treaties that ban chemical and biological weapons and the disarmament agreements associated with the NPT, with better monitoring, verification, accountability etc., and, furthermore, to initiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would ban such weapons for all time.

With regard to the NPT 2000's Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, civil society should consider five approaches: diplomatic, international, parliamentary, national, and local, but there is no room to describe strategies for each in detail. What can Japan do? Is your government scared of offending the United States, Japan's major ally? How can you make the government even more fearful of offending you, its citizens – the electorate?

This calls for a well-coordinated campaign to rouse public opinion and direct the message at elected officials at the local and national levels. How can we work with governments to repel the threat from weapons of mass destruction? We can begin by raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear policies and using our democratic rights to press for changes that will bring us greater security.

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Questions & Answers

Member of Audience: How likely is the Bush administration to deploy a missile defense system in space, and how would Russia react?

Rauf: U.S. government officials said that they want to deploy some of the elements of missile defense in space by the year 2004, maybe in Alaska.

Timerbaev: If the U.S. proceeds with missile defense in space, Russia will have to respond.

Member of Audience: What is the significance of the ICJ advisory on the illegality of nuclear weapons? Was dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima a war crime?

Johnson: At the time Hiroshima was bombed, no-one understood the terrible effects. Now that knowledge has contributed to the ICJ Opinion. Any future use of nuclear weapons in a situation like the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings would certainly be war crimes.

Member of Audience: Even if Japan advocates the abolition of nuclear weapons, other countries will not listen to Japan, which is under the U. S. nuclear umbrella. What do Americans think about Japan leaving the alliance?

Scheinman: I think that Japan would be far better able to influence U.S. policy by staying as a member of the alliance than by leaving it. The United States values its close relations with Japan and wants to sustain and strengthen the alliance, not to see it disintegrate.

Member of Audience: But wouldn't Japan be able to concentrate on eliminating nuclear weapons by leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella?

MacFhionnbhairr: Being an ally is an advantage in the sense that Japan is treated as an equal partner. In the initial stages, steps toward nuclear disarmament would progress within the framework of the alliance. It is Japan's responsibility to influence an ally who possesses nuclear weapons.

Member of Audience: Do you think there are enough opportunities for NGO's to influence the outcome of international conferences?

Johnson: The role of NGOs will be limited once a conference has started, so the key time to exert pressure is to work on your parliamentarians and governments well before the conference takes place, so that you influence their policy and positions in advance.

The UN Conference on Small Arms: Its Outcome and Implications

By Masamichi Kamiya

The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN conference on small arms) was held July 9 to 20, 2001, at the UN headquarters in New York. The event was a product of a concerted effort by the international community to take action for the first time on the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

In retrospect, the end of the Cold War gave the world two reasons to get involved in the SALWs issue. First, the supply of such weapons, which had little use after the Cold War, increased dramatically in conflict zones where the United States and the then Soviet Union had lost their influence as superpowers. Second, as the risk of nuclear war faded, the world's attention shifted from nuclear to conventional disarmament, symbolized by SALWs and anti-personnel landmines.

In the post-Cold War period, African states have suffered most from the carnage SALWs can unleash. Civil wars in Somalia, Angola and Rwanda have killed tens of thousands of people. In the 1990s, according to the United Nations, SALWs killed at least four million people, 90 percent of whom were civilians, 80 percent of them women and children.

The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 1995 by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, urged the

international community to ameliorate the problem of SALWs. In his report, he emphasized the importance of ridding the world of SALWs and landmines, a process described as micro disarmament.

The Japanese government responded quickly to Boutros-Ghali's plea. Japan has submitted resolutions to the UN General Assembly every year since 1995, and has played a leading role on the three preparatory committees for this summer's UN conference. The Japanese government's leadership in this field has won international praise.

The problem should be viewed in both domestic and regional contexts. It is made more complex because of its close links with national security, the right of people to bear arms, disarmament, conflict resolution, law enforcement, organized crime, terrorism, and socio-economic development. Furthermore, it has proven more difficult to wage an international campaign against small arms and light weapons than on landmines, because the former are not universally regarded as inhumane. The conference defined SALWs as handguns, automatic machine guns and any weapon that can be carried on the person. Anti-personnel landmines were excluded from the definition since a ban on them is covered by a separate agreement.

The conference's main aim was to adopt a programme of action

Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

Reports on Denuclearization in South Africa and the Role of NGOs

By Kazumi Mizumoto

HPI research project on nuclear disarmament in the 21st century met in May and July to listen to presentations by members and guest speakers, ask and answer questions and exchange opinions. On July 27, foreign scholars and specialists due to participate in a symposium the following day were invited to address members of the project. Following are highlights of the meeting:

● The 12th meeting (May 25)

Guest Speaker: Hiroaki Matsui, professor, Faculty of International Relations, Daito Bunka University

Title: "On Russia's Nuclear Policy"

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus inherited its nuclear warheads. After the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) was concluded between the United States and the four countries, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus handed over their nuclear weapons to Russia and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states. Russia was slow to ratify START II, which was signed in January 1993, due to deteriorating relations between Moscow and Washington. Russian President Vladimir Putin persuaded the Duma to support START II, arguing that a reduction in Russia's nuclear arsenal would help its economy. Russia ratified START II in April 2000. In the same month, the official Russian military doctrine was revised for the first time in seven years. The international situation was described as a confrontation between "the monopolar power of Western developed countries, centered around the United States" and "the powers, including Russia, leaning toward a multipolar world." The new doctrine recognized ethnic extremism, religious extremism, and separatism as threats, and regarding nuclear issues, said that Russia intended to maintain its status as a nuclear superpower. The doctrine also made a specific commitment to reductions in nuclear weapons and no-first-uses provided that the balance of strategic weapons was maintained and attempts were made to strengthen the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It should be pointed out, though, that nuclear weapons are more readily available and Russia's dependence on them is, in fact, increasing.

Putin strategy appears to ride out the transitional period until the economy recovers and conventional military forces have been restored. The strategy also involves decreasing the number of nuclear weapons to between 1,000 and 1,500. Russia hopes to boost its economy and modernize its conventional weapons by exporting arms. The major obstacle to this is the U.S. missile defense program. In response, the Russians are using their commitment to the ABM treaty to instigate formation of a network of opposition to missile defense. Some in Russia are opposed to that approach, however, since they believe that a prolonged political confrontation with the United States will damage the national interest.

Guest Speaker: Yoshihiko Fujimoto, associate professor, Hiroshima University of Economics

Title: "Nuclear Issues in South African Foreign Policy"

In 1993, then South African President F.W. de Klerk admitted that his country had begun producing nuclear weapons in 1974, and had had six atomic bombs in 1989, but added that the government had decommissioned all of them in 1990. That process, from nuclear development through denuclearization, needs to be viewed in the context of apartheid and the resulting international isolation, and the country's return to the international fold following the release from prison and election as president of Nelson Mandela.

During apartheid, from 1948 through 1994, the Armament Corporation of South Africa (ARMSOR) was established to help build a self-sufficient military since arms exports to the country had been embargoed by the United Nations. South Africa chose to arm itself with nuclear weapons during that period in response to the worldwide condemnation of apartheid and the country's ostracism from the international community.

The rise in African nationalism, the presence of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola and the threat of communism also led the country in that direction.

So why did South Africa later scrap its nuclear arsenal? First, it was under considerable international pressure to do so. Second, the threat from Angola had disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Third, South Africa wanted once again to become a constructive

(POA) that would curb the illicit trade in SALWs and promote the collection and destruction of excessive and destabilizing weapons in conflict zones. A draft POA prepared by the chairman at the end of the first week mentioned the need for a) the positive manifestation of political will, b) pragmatic plans at the national, regional and global levels, c) international cooperation and assistance, and d) follow-up measures. The U.S. representative, however, wished to delete passages calling for restrictions on the private ownership of SALWs and regulations on supplying SALWs to governments or government-authorized bodies. It appeared, for a moment, that the draft POA would fall at the first hurdle. However, African states, which played a constructive role at the conference, accepted the U.S. demand, and the POA was adopted unanimously.

The plan of action emphasizes the responsibility of the state to address the problem of SALWs. It urges national governments to strengthen domestic laws and draw up codes of conduct. National initiatives must, of course, be supplemented by action at the regional and global levels.

Second, follow-up measures are an integral part of the POA. They include plans to: a) to convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress, b) to convene a meeting of states on biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the POA, c) to undertake a UN study for an international instrument for tracing, and d) to consider further steps to enhance international

cooperation in dealing with SALWs.

Third, the POA stresses the importance of partnerships between governments and civil society, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are expected to oversee the collection and destruction of excess SALWs in conflict zones. Hopes are high among the international community that the government-civil society partnership will grow in this vital area.

Finally, several other factors connected with the wider issue of the United Nations and disarmament emerged during the conference.

First, by adopting the POA, the international community showed how serious it was about small arms and light weapons. It was significant that all states shared the view that the UN conference was the beginning, not the end, of the process of eliminating SALWs.

Second, mention should be made of the great contribution of African states, which had been less visible at previous conferences.

Third, it was agreed that the protection of human security, human dignity and the culture of peace should be an integral part of SALWs disarmament. These factors had drawn little attention at previous conferences.

As the representative from Sierra Leone said, SALWs are a matter of life and death. Such weapons are complex, but the international community has a duty to do all it can to reduce their number.

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member of the international community. Finally, the country's white leadership did not want a possible future government led by blacks to have nuclear weapons at its disposal.

Following its return to the community of nations, South Africa chaired the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, trying to serve as a bridge between North and South. As a member of the New Agenda Coalition, it is now attempting to forge diplomatic links with a large number of countries.

● The 13th meeting (July 6)

Guest Speaker: Hiromichi Umabayashi, president, the Peace Depot, Inc.

Title: "The Role of NGOs in Nuclear Disarmament, with Special Interests in Japanese NGOs"

NGOs play an important role in nuclear disarmament. In 1996, for example, the World Court Project successfully obtained an advisory declaring nuclear weapons illegal from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This particular project began life in the 1980s as an anti-nuclear campaign in New Zealand. Legal professionals and specialists formed an international NGO to pursue its goals. And when the NPT review conference was held in 1995, many NGOs went to the United Nations to lobby participants and monitor the discussions.

Abolition 2000 was set up to push for an agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapons by 2000. Campaigners drew up a draft treaty and took their message to people around the world, generating impetus for new campaigns in the process. They included Trident Ploughshares 2000, the campaign against the nuclear-related facilities. The campaign is being held mainly in Scotland. Members of that group were acquitted of charges of attempting to damage a nuclear submarine, an encouraging development for other anti-nuclear activists. In Japan, NGOs formed the Tokyo Forum, giving citizens the opportunity to meet directly officials from the Foreign Ministry.

Speaker: Yoko Ogashiwa, project member; associate professor, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University

Title: "Denuclearization in the Southern Hemisphere; Prospects for Interregional Cooperation"

There are five nuclear-free zone treaties in the Southern

Hemisphere; the Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America and the Caribbean); the Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific); the Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia); the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa); and the Antarctic Treaty.

There were other moves toward denuclearization in the Southern Hemisphere during the 1990s. In South America, Brazil and Argentina issued a joint declaration on atomic energy policy in 1990, and reached agreement on establishing an institution to control nuclear materials a year later. They also acceded to the NPT. In addition, Argentina, Chile and Brazil ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty.

In the South Pacific, France suspended nuclear testing after it had resumed in the face of widespread international criticism. The United States, Britain and France signed the CTBT and a protocol attached to the Rarotonga Treaty, which was also signed by Vanuatu and Tonga.

There was greater cooperation between the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) and the Pacific Islands Forum, which in turn strengthened ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A resolution calling for the denuclearization of the Southern Hemisphere was passed at the UN General Assembly in 1996. It was opposed, however, by the United States, Britain and France, with Russia, India, and Israel abstaining. There is an urgent need to forge greater cooperation between regional organizations in the Southern Hemisphere and for them to work more closely with the New Agenda Coalition.

● Workshop (July 27)

Title: On the Final report of the "Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century"

Participants: Lawrence Scheinman, Roland M. Timerbaev, Rebecca Johnson, and project members.

The research project plans to publish a final report, tentatively titled "Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century" by next spring. The report will be written by nine specialists based overseas, including the five present at the workshop, project members, and Hiromichi Umabayashi. On July 27, the writers discussed outlines of their contributions with project members and guests. The workshop ended an hour later than scheduled after heated and fruitful discussions.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI

9th and 10th meetings : The UN Humanitarian Intervention

The HPI research project on new-interventionism met for the 9th time on June 22 in Tokyo. Kaoruko Seki, humanitarian affairs officer at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, gave a speech on the role of the United Nations in responding to humanitarian crises.

The UN Security Council recognizes “threats to international peace and security” set out in Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter in three situations: During civil war, for humanitarian reasons, and to restore democratic government. However, each resolution is reached after a consideration of the merits of each case, so there are no consistencies in the recognition of threats or in the type of action taken. This implies that the UN system is unreliable. Opinion is divided over whether it is possible to establish stricter standards for UN intervention. This division can be seen in definitions of human rights abuses, alternatives to military action to restore peace and the extent to which the United Nations should pursue them, and the appropriate scale of intervention and methods to ensure its success.

The controversy naturally affects conclusions drawn from such debates. Some argue that the current system, in which the use of force is accepted as exceptional, should be reformed into one that more readily authorizes the use of force. Others counter that force should, in principle, be prohibited to prevent its indiscriminate use, and that whether it is permissible or not should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

The current UN system, which permits intervention, has clear drawbacks and has prompted the introduction of several measures, notably the setting up of the department of humanitarian affairs. The department adopts a coordinated, comprehensive approach in

extending humanitarian assistance, such as rescuing refugees and displaced people caught up in conflicts. In addition, attempts have been made to establish better coordination, and to place responses to humanitarian crises in a single framework. As part of those efforts, the department of humanitarian affairs has tried to link NGOs, with their firsthand knowledge, with the Security Council, which decides whether or not the United Nations should intervene. These developments, together with a general upsurge in humanitarianism, are considered instrumental in the growing number of resolutions on humanitarian interventions.

Seki then discussed problems of decision making in the United Nations. Accountability and the difficulties in maintaining objectivity in recognizing humanitarian crises were addressed during the question and answer session.

The project met for the 10th time on Aug. 23. Satoru Kurosawa, director of the global issues division of the planning and evaluation department of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Prof. Motomi Tomaru of Tamagawa University Global Education Center were the guest speakers. Kurosawa chaired the session on a JICA report on peace building published in March 2001. Following is a summary of Kurosawa’s remarks.

The JICA report comes in three parts. The first part defines the concept of peace building. The second makes suggestions, and the third part contains guidelines on peace building within the current system.

JICA’s involvement in peace building has been born of the belief that the political-military framework alone is insufficient to achieve breakthroughs and that developmental assistance is also necessary. There are three pillars to peace building: Humanitarian emergency

UN Conference on Disarmament in Ishikawa-Kanazawa:

Exploring a New Vision for Disarmament in the 21st Century

By Masamichi Kamiya

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Ishikawa-Kanazawa met in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, from Aug. 28 to 31, 2001. The meeting, held annually in Japan for the past 13 years, was attended by 63 disarmament experts from 17 countries. They included government officials, academics and NGO members.

This year’s conference was titled “The evolution of the scope of security and disarmament in the 21st century.” The topics under discussion in the Conference included stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia, the multifaceted dimension of security, weapons of mass destruction, institutions and actors for the promotion of peace and disarmament, and the UN conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

In his opening remarks, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, the UN Under-Secretary-General for disarmament affairs, voiced the hope that the conference would produce a new definition of security, and emphasized that both states and NGOs could play a much bigger role in promoting “sustainable disarmament.”

In a keynote speech, Prof. Robert Scalapino of the University of California, Berkeley, analyzed the domestic situations in and bilateral arrangements among states in Northeast Asia necessary to maintain peace and stability in the region. He was cautiously optimistic, predicting that the region would encounter ups and

downs on the road to prosperity.

The following points emerged from the four-day conference: a) the multifaceted nature of security, b) growing number of actors in disarmament, c) comprehensive nature of disarmament, and d) crisis in the rule of law and in the multilateral approach to disarmament.

First, speakers favored a broader view of security. Some participants, superseding the traditional concept of security, included human security in their definition, encompassing such factors as economic development, environmental protection, dialogue among civilizations, a culture of peace, the IT revolution and globalization.

Second, it was pointed out that not only states and the United Nations but also civil society, particularly NGOs, had an important role to play in promoting sustainable disarmament.

Third, during a plenary session on small arms, it was argued that disarmament must be viewed against the background of the emergent needs of the new century. In short, while it is important to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction (macro disarmament), progress must be made on the disarmament of small arms and anti-personnel landmines (micro disarmament). A comprehensive approach to disarmament is indispensable, it was argued.

assistance, aid for restoration and development, and the prevention of conflict recurrence. Efforts to build peace should combine all three elements. In other words, we must identify the structural causes as well as factors that trigger the conflict and those that immediately precipitate the conflict. Any assistance should be designed to negate these causes. Often, a more refined approach is required that includes, for example, bridging the gap between emergency assistance, the repatriation of refugees, and assistance provided on their return home.

Analyzing Japan's system of emergency assistance, Kurosawa spoke of "air pockets" in the current legal system.

Those air pockets prevent Japan from extending proper humanitarian assistance during or immediately after a conflict. Japan is supposedly part of the worldwide humanitarian relief system stipulated in a UN law on peace keeping and other operations. But Japan's so-called Five Principles of Peace Keeping Operations prevent it from truly doing so. Japan Disaster Relief Team is unable to take part in refugee-relief activities because they can be dispatched only in the case of a natural disaster. JICA cannot quickly respond to emergency situations, as it is limited to granting assistance based on agreements between governments. All JICA can do is support NGOs in their endeavors through the Japan Platform organization.

Besides these systematic problems, JICA faces other challenges. It must get involved in emergency and reconstruction assistance, as well as playing a role in conflict prevention. It should formulate a social development plan with the idea of peace building in mind, and take care not to allow its aid to become one of the causes of conflict. In short, this means not contributing to the increasing gaps between rich and poor and not encouraging the unequal distribution of wealth.

Tomaru worked for many years for the UN Development Program (UNDP), and was loaned to the UN peace-keeping operation in Tajikistan, to the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. Tomaru reported on conflict resolution in Tajikistan, and the roles of

the UN special envoy and UNMOT.

The conflict in Tajikistan was caused by a combination of interregional rivalries inside the country, support from outside for insurgent groups, and a regional struggle over rights and interests that came out of the domestic strife. Central authority rested with ethnic groups in the Hojand and Kulyab regions, so that other parties, which were poorly treated, were attracted to Islamic organizations. This coalition of disgruntled groups became the main antigovernment opposition, and the conflict in Tajikistan escalated.

The United Nations sent an inspection team to Tajikistan in 1992, and set up a liaison office there a year later.

The UN special envoy played a particularly important role in resolving the conflict in Tajikistan. As talks continued between the government and the anti-government forces, the envoy recognized the links between the government and its ally, and between the anti-government forces and a country that supported them. The envoy improved the chances of conciliation by obtaining the cooperation of all countries involved in the conflict. Both parties decided to work toward a political settlement rather than continuing to divide the nation through war.

Although UN-mediated reconciliation is regarded as having been successful in Tajikistan, Tomaru pointed out several problems. First, providing development aid before a peace settlement is reached could, in fact, hamper the progress of negotiations. It is important, therefore, to provide humanitarian assistance while peace talks are in progress. Help with development should come only after peace has been achieved. In Tajikistan, the government and opposition forces came together rather than continue the armed conflict. Though this was welcomed, the lack of a thorough disarmament plan meant that bringing ordinary citizens together took considerably longer.

By Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPI

UN Conference on Disarmament in Ishikawa-Kanazawa

Fourth, attention focused on the increasingly unilateralist foreign policy of the United States. Many participants criticized U.S. missile defense and the possible abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Some said U.S. unilateralism jeopardized the international rule of law and the multilateral approach to disarmament.

On the second day, conference participants and students from Ishikawa Prefecture exchanged views. The youngsters, who have no first-hand experience of war or the nuclear catastrophe, put a great deal of effort into the discussions, taking advantage of this opportunity for them to learn from the mistakes of the past.

One conference participant from Japan and one from the United States who had attended the above-mentioned programme, exchanged very impressive views with each other. The Japanese participant, referring to the decrease in the number of students visiting the Peace Memorial Museum in Hiroshima, said that Japan must continue to teach its young about what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 56 years ago. His American counterpart, however, said that doing so might increase feelings of humiliation, while memories subsided of the United States' strategic reasons for dropping the bombs.

Ishikawa Gov. Masanori Tanimoto gave a presentation on the role of local governments. Emphasizing the complementary role of localities in central government-led diplomacy, he gave an overview of his prefecture's international activities. Ishikawa Prefecture, which has sponsored the annual UN Symposium on

Northeast Asia since 1995, is known for its commitment to peace and disarmament.

The conference demonstrated that security has become a multifaceted concept; that disarmament should be seen as a comprehensive process; and that the promotion of disarmament involves an increasing number of actors. In particular, the meeting agreed that it was vitally important for local and national governments, international organizations and civil society to cooperate to bring about disarmament.

To that end, it would be a good idea to open a branch office of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in a city in Northeast Asia. Japan, the only nation to have suffered the nuclear attacks, would be an ideal venue for UN functions related to disarmament. For obvious reasons, Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be among the favored candidates, as would Ishikawa Prefecture, which has enjoyed peace for the last 400 years.

It will take time to act on the aforementioned proposal. As a first step, Hiroshima and Nagasaki should enhance their role in bringing together local governments in Japan through the Mayors for Peace movement. The world expects a great deal of local governments, which can bridge the gap between officialdom and citizens.

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI

DIARY

July 1 - October 31, 2001

Jul. 4 Nobumasa Akiyama attends a seminar, "Reconstruction assistance in Kosovo and East Timor: Joint evaluation by the Foreign Ministry and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)," organized by the Foreign Ministry of Japan, held at the United Nations University.

Jul. 6 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 13th meeting.

Jul. 7 Kazumi Mizumoto attends a research meeting of the Chugoku-Shikoku branch of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, held at Yamaguchi Prefectural University.

Akiyama attends an international symposium, "On the front lines of conflict prevention in Asia," organized by and held at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Jul. 9-20 Masamichi Kamiya acts as an advisor at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held at the UN headquarters in New York.

Jul. 14-17 Akiyama attends a seminar organized by the Association for Communication of Transcultural Studies held in Nago, Okinawa.

Jul. 19 Mizumoto delivers a lecture on humanitarian intervention and Japan's contribution at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima Bar Association's peace promotion committee, held at the association's conference room.

Jul. 20 HPI President Fukui delivers a lecture, "From A-bomb city Hiroshima to the world: Toward nuclear elimination," at Nara YMCA.

Jul. 25 Mizumoto attends a workshop on arms control, disarmament and security organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, held at JIIA. The workshop featured a lecture, "An evaluation of the non-effectuation of CTBT and future tasks," by Prof. Masahiko Asada of Kyoto University.

Jul. 27 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds a workshop.

Jul. 28 HPI sponsors an international symposium, "Where does the 'unequivocal undertaking' stand?: The current situation and Japan's responsibilities in the elimination of nuclear weapons," held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center.

Aug. 4 Akiyama attends Peace Forum 2001, run by the Hiroshima Junior Chamber, as a coordinator and delivers a lecture on peace.

Aug. 5 Fukui attends the opening of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-city Solidarity, sponsored by Hiroshima city and Nagasaki city.

Mizumoto takes the chair and delivers a report, "The role of cities and citizens in the elimination of nuclear weapons," during a meeting with city residents titled "What we should do to eliminate nuclear weapons." The event was part of the 5th meeting of the mayors' conference.

Aug. 23 HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 10th meeting.

Aug. 24 Fukui gives a lecture at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Confederation of A-bomb Sufferers Organizations at Hiroshima Peace Hall.

Aug. 27-Sept. 4 Akiyama visits Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Turkey.

Aug. 28-31 Kamiya attends the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Ishikawa-Kanazawa, organized by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, held at Hotel Nikko Kanazawa.

Sept. 1-24 Ikuko Togo participates in the international visitor program of the U.S. State Department, as a member of the human security team. She visits Washington, D.C., New York, Colorado Springs, and Los Angeles to exchange ideas and information with staff of the State Department, the Defense Department, the United Nations, and NGOs.

Sept. 6 Akiyama delivers a lecture on the politics and administration of Japan at a general orientation meeting for participants in a training program operated by the

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Sept. 14 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 14th meeting.

Sept. 18 Mizumoto attends the first meeting of the Committee for Studying Peace Policies organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA).

HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 11th meeting.

Sept. 19 Akiyama attends a workshop on disarmament and security, organized by the Center for Global Communications, at the International University of Japan.

Sept. 27 Mizumoto attends an international workshop on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The workshop featured a lecture on missile defense by Prof. Shuichiro Iwata of the National Defense Academy, Japan.

Oct. 2 Akira Matsunaga, a research fellow at the EastWest Institute and research associate at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, gives a lecture, "The background to the terror in the U.S.: The world of Islamic fundamentalism and its infiltration into Eurasia," at a forum organized by HPI.

Oct. 3 Akiyama attends a meeting of the Asia-Europe Foundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.

Oct. 9 Fukui attends a reception for UN Disarmament Fellows.

Oct. 10 Fukui, Mizumoto, Akiyama and Kamiya meet UN Disarmament Fellows at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Oct. 12 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 15th meeting.

Oct. 13, 14 Togo attends the annual meeting of the Japanese Political Science Association at Rikkyo University.

Oct. 15 Fukui attends a Japan- Israel exchange program meeting organized by the Japan Center for International Exchange.

HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 12th meeting at Toshi Center Hotel in Tokyo.

Oct. 16-22 Akiyama visits Thailand and Malaysia, and attends the 7th SPE Issy-Kul Forum in Kuala Lumpur.

Oct. 19 Mizumoto attends the first meeting of the working group of the Committee for Studying Peace Policies organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) at Hiroshima Prefectural Government Office.

Oct. 24 Fukui delivers a lecture, "The peace problem in the 21st century," at a Soroptimists' meeting at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.

Oct. 25 Benjamin L. Self, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, gives a lecture, "Coordinating U.S. and Japanese Responses to Chinese Military Modernization," at a forum organized by HPI.

—Visitors to HPI—

Aug. 3 Niu Qiang, secretary general of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament

Wen De Sheng, deputy director of the executive office of Chinese Association for International Understanding

Aug. 16 Fazal-ur-Rahman, senior research fellow at the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies

Sept. 7 Elizabeth Donaldson, language trainee at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo

Oct. 9 Nassrine Azimi, chief at the New York Office of United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

— Employment Opportunities at HPI —

HPI, based at Hiroshima City University, Japan, seeks applicants for positions of instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and/or professor ranks.

Applicants should have a solid academic grounding in one or more the following areas: theory of peace and methodology of peace research; the nuclear holocausts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the development, production, deployment, proliferation, disarmament and abolition of nuclear and conventional weapons; international and domestic war, peace, conflict resolution, and security in the Asia-Pacific region; and pacifistic ideas, culture, and movements in the Asia-Pacific region.

Candidates should possess, or be in the process of obtaining, a

doctorate. Fluency in English is required. Older scholars under 60 are encouraged to apply. Applications must reach the Institute by December 20, 2001. All appointments will be effective on dates between July 1, 2002 and April 1, 2003.

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Before applying, please refer to our Web site at:

<http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm>

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