

## A Step in the Right Direction: An Analysis of the 6th NPT Review Conference

By Mitsuru Kurosawa

### Introduction: Good Start Despite Pre-conference Pessimism

The general mood going into the recent NPT review conference was one of pessimism. The previous five years had seen little or no progress in disarmament, as India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the implementation of START II (the 2nd Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the United States and Russia stalled. In addition, U.S.-Russia, and U.S.-China relations soured due to the expansion eastward of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. plans for National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems, and the conflict in Kosovo.

Once the conference got underway, however, unexpected progress was made, not least because the Russian Duma ratified START II and the CTBT shortly before it began. Another factor was the establishment, on the first day of the conference, of subsidiary bodies, a demand that had been made by non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The NNWS had wanted the bodies to be set up to discuss measures related to "nuclear disarmament" and "the Middle East." The U.S. initially opposed the both. On the latter request, made by Egypt and Middle East nations, a compromise was reached whereby the issue would form part of a discussion on "the region of the Middle East."

For the first two weeks of the conference, however, consensus eluded participating nations. Despite this, the committees began work on drafting a final document in the third week. Given the number of differences remaining, it looked unlikely that the final document, proposed at the end of the third week, would be adopted. However, agreement was reached after the conference was extended by a day.

The discussions that paved the way for the adoption of a final document were held in six forums. Main Committee I addressed the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament, while its subsidiary body dealt with the future steps toward nuclear disarmament. Main Committee II discussed safeguards and nuclear weapon-free zones, while its subsidiary discussed regional issues. Main Committee III looked at the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Each of these forums contributed to the drafting of the document, as well as discussing ways to strengthen the review process at plenary meetings.

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### Conference Structure

The confrontation between the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) and non-nuclear weapon states, and/or that between the P5 and the Non-Aligned movement (NAM) had dictated the structure of previous NPT conferences. This time, we witnessed considerable conflict among the nuclear-weapon states, particularly between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China, over NMD and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Another new and powerful factor was the emergence of a group of non-nuclear weapon states called the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which negotiated directly with the P5 right to the end of the conference. The coalition includes four NAM countries (Egypt, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa), and three non-NAM nations (Sweden, Ireland and New Zealand). In addition, another new group NATO5 (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Norway) appeared as the European Union's pro-disarmament faction. Japan and Australia came forward early on with a joint proposal on non-proliferation and disarmament. Although Canada did not join, the possibility remains that these three countries will formalize their grouping at future conferences.

### Main Points of Discussion

The relationship between the NMD and the ABM treaty proved to be the most complex issue facing the conference. Russia and China attacked the United States over the NMD, and many NNWS that are not allied with the United States advocated retaining the ABM treaty in its current form. During the second week, the P5 issued a common statement which included "preserving and strengthening the treaty," an ambiguous approach that seemed to satisfy critics of the P5. China and Russia were satisfied by the P5's clear statement of "preserving" the ABM treaty. For its part, the United States left open the option of amending the treaty in the name of "strengthening" it. This compromise helped put the problem aside for the time being.

The second most important issue was the P5's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The NAC placed priority on obtaining "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." During the second week, the P5 proposed using the word "ultimate," only to be met by demands from NAC for a more "substantial" commitment. China had supported an unequivocal undertaking from the outset, while the United States and Britain wanted "conditions" attached, and France and Russia were opposed. In the end, agreement was reached, but a NAC proposal for "concrete steps within five years" was scuppered. The third key issue was the future of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The final document retreated the previous objective of "the immediate commencement and early conclusion" of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and urged to set up a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, not as a body to "negotiate" nuclear disarmament, but merely as one to "deal with" it.

Fourth, the subjects of transparency and irreversibility, which were broached two or three years ago, were included in the document, albeit in a watered down form.

### Future Steps and Obstacles

1) The clause related to early entry into force of the CTBT contains the phrase, "in accordance with constitutional processes." This was inserted

at the request of the United States, and indicated its intention to oppose the treaty as long as the Senate does the same.

2) A moratorium on nuclear testing was adopted without problems, proof that progress has been made since the previous conference.

3) With regard to negotiations in the CD regarding a cut-off treaty, NAC opinion was reflected in the document, which said, "taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives." However, they did not obtain a commitment to the immediate commencement of negotiations. Instead, the final text was watered down, saying, "The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years."

4) The establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament was requested, but the terminology was again changed from "negotiating."

5) The range of application of the "principle of irreversibility" was extended to include "other related arms control and reduction measures" at the request of the P5, thereby diluting its effect.

6) The P5 did agree to an "unequivocal undertaking" to "accomplish the total elimination" of their nuclear arsenals. The NAC also compromised by agreeing to the removal of a commitment to "engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament" by 2005.

7) The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the speedy conclusion of START III were urged, and "preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty" was also included. The reference to preservation satisfied China and Russia, while the United States was happy to the interpretation that "strengthening" the treaty could also be interpreted as amending it.

8) A trilateral initiative by the United States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all excess fissile materials under IAEA supervision was welcomed by all parties.

9) Concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament to be taken by all nuclear-weapon states were proposed, but Russia succeeded in inserting the clause, "in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all." The six steps require P5 nations to: reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; to increase transparency; to further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons; to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; to promote a diminishing role for nuclear weapons; and to engage as soon as appropriate in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the original proposal, transparency was to be applied to stores of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but in the final document, transparency was limited to nuclear weapons capability. Furthermore, the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI (to support

further progress on nuclear disarmament) was weakened after it was referred to as "a voluntary confidence-building measure" in the final document.

A condition was imposed stating that the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons be "based on unilateral initiatives," and in a clause proposing that nuclear weapon states reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons, explicit references, such as "de-alerting," were removed.

With regard to the diminishing role of nuclear weapons, a NAC proposal to eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons was altered to "minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used." The use of the word "minimize" was agreed to by Japan, Germany and other allies. In addition, a clause referring to the process of eliminating was changed from "as soon as possible" to "as soon as appropriate."

10) A recommendation that excess fissile materials be verified by the IAEA was weakened by the addition of the words "as soon as practicable."

11) Regarding the total disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons, the NAC had wanted to place priority on the former. However, P5 countries, particularly France, insisted that general and complete disarmament refer to both nuclear and conventional weapons.

12) The final document calls on parties to issue reports on progress being made on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures, but they will be required to issue "regular reports" rather than annual reports, as had originally been proposed.

13) A clause calling for the further development of disarmament verification capabilities was adopted without significant debate.

## Conclusion

To summarize, the fact that a comprehensive final document was adopted at all is laudable.

However, a detailed study of each section reveals that concrete measures that might have given teeth to "an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" were watered down considerably.

Yet the NPT review conference did succeed in obtaining from the P5 an unequivocal undertaking to abolish nuclear weapons. That commitment, though, is nominal, and lacks substance in the form of practical steps. Certainly, more needs to be done to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. The issue now and for the 21st century is exactly what form that commitment will take.

*Kurosawa is a professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and the project leader of the Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century at Hiroshima Peace Institute.*

## HPI Web Site Carries Reports, Commentary on NPT Review Conference

The Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) set up a special site carrying news in Japanese from the NPT 2000 Review Conference held at the UN Headquarters in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The site, part of the institute's home page, carried fresh reports on major developments at the conference by Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute in Britain, Jenni Rissanen, an analyst at the Acronym Institute, Dr. Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and HPI research fellows.

Johnson and Rissanen's English-language reports on 18 issues were distributed at the conference venue every day or every other day, and were also posted on the Acronym Institute's web site during the conference. As soon as the articles were completed, they were e-mailed to HPI, where they were translated into Japanese. Kurosawa, who attended the conference, provided a round up of developments every weekend, and HPI researchers submitted a total of eight stories.

In addition, the HPI site carries summaries of HPI workshops relating to the NPT review conference and announcements of HPI-sponsored symposiums. The sites "Links" section now features official documents from the conference, UN press releases and other useful information.

Since the special site was set up, the number of visitors per day to HPI's web site has doubled. E-mail inquiries have also been sent to HPI. The NPT special site can still be accessed on the HPI web site at <http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm>

The following people translated the Acronym Institute reports: Minobu Arai, a translator and interpreter, and postgraduate student at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University; Etsuko Ohara, a former journalist with The Asahi Shimbun; Tomohiko Kobayashi, postgraduate student of the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University; Keiko Sakata, a part-time researcher at GENDAI Advanced Studies Research Organization; and Noriko Sado, a research assistant at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

*By Ritsuko Ogawa, coordinator of the international relations office at HPI*

# Concrete Steps Must Follow P5 Pledge to Eliminate Nuclear Arsenals

By Rebecca Johnson

At the close of the sixth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon states pledged an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," and agreed to a number of practical steps towards this goal. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, hailed the agreement as a "historic consensus" and "significant step." Ambassador Antonio de la Caza, speaking on behalf of the seven non-nuclear New Agenda countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) credited with achieving the breakthrough, said the agreements meant that "what had always been implicit has now become explicit."

Confounding predictions of disaster, the NPT Conference was a success, at least in diplomatic terms. But do such diplomatic agreements mean anything when it comes to the real world and national security calculations? At the 2000 review conference, U.S. missile defence plans and the impasse in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) over fissile material cut-off (FMCT) negotiations were swept under the carpet in deals among the nuclear powers. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were criticised, even as France and Russia raced for nuclear contracts with India.

The United States' insistence on 'balancing' calls for Israel to adhere to the Treaty with criticisms of Iraqi non-compliance almost prevented a final agreement. After the clock was stopped to allow a further 24 hours of negotiations, a compromise was achieved on the basis of an earlier statement from the IAEA director general saying that the agency had carried out inspections, but had been unable to verify that Iraq was in compliance.

In addition to firming up the NPT's Article VI obligation on nuclear disarmament, the conference's final document underlined the importance of the START process and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and called on India and Pakistan to implement the 1998 UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 1172) to join the CTBT and NPT, and not to weaponise their nuclear capabilities. The nuclear weapon states agreed to further unilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, still deployed in Europe. Despite China's traditional dislike of transparency, Beijing at the last minute accepted a commitment to provide more information on its "nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements."

Further paragraphs emphasised the need to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems and to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. Mindful of how fissile material and components from dismantled warheads could be recycled to make new weapons, the parties placed importance on applying the principle of irreversibility to arms control. Finally, all five nuclear weapon states were called on to engage "as soon as appropriate" in negotiating nuclear disarmament, a demand that Japan has underscored in successive resolutions to the UN General Assembly. The New Agenda's dual-track approach of requiring an unequivocal commitment from the weapon states and identifying practical, achievable interim steps formed the backbone of the disarmament negotiations.

Forecasts in the run-up to the 2000 NPT Conference had been pessimistic. The view was widely shared that any movement made in nuclear non-proliferation since 1985 had regressed as a result of a number of adverse developments, particularly: the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate in October 1999; deadlock in the START process and at the CD in Geneva; and growing concerns about the impact on nuclear arms control of U.S. plans for national missile defence.

The negative dynamic was changed by the Russian Duma's ratification of the CTBT and START II just before the review conference opened. By contrast, the United States was forced on the defensive, as countries lined up to criticise U.S. missile defence plans.

The Conference was therefore surprised when China and Russia signed up to a five-power statement that was open to a multitude of interpretations on the ABM treaty. The careful language spoke of "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." It was clear that the nuclear powers had collectively agreed to keep the NMD issue out of the NPT.

After three weeks of debates in three committees on nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, all the positions had been rehearsed, but few had been resolved. Particular interest was focussed on two 'subsidiary bodies' - formal working groups open to all NPT members - on nuclear disarmament and regional issues, including the Middle East. Chaired by New Zealander Clive Pearson, the NPT parties in the nuclear disarmament subsidiary body concentrated on forward-looking ideas, focussing first on the "unfinished agenda," including START, the CTBT and the "fissban," and then on new or further steps. The breakthrough came after the nuclear weapon states and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) met privately and hammered out a compromise text, which was eventually accepted by the whole conference.

That left the review and assessment of progress since 1995 in Committee I, where delegations had strong disagreements over several issues, including nuclear testing, stockpile reinforcement and nuclear weapons modernisation, the significance of dismantlements and numbers of weapons remaining in the arsenals, and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. That, too, came to be worked on privately and agreed among a small group consisting of the weapon states, the NAC and a few others, including Indonesia (on behalf of the non-aligned states) and three NATO countries.

Did the nuclear powers mean to go so far, or did they become trapped in a web of their own rivalries? A number of countries put forward ideas and programmes for action, but the weapon states chose to do business with the New Agenda Coalition because it was more pragmatic than the non-aligned movement and represented a wider constituency than, say, Japan or Canada. In addition, the New Agenda states had a well-developed strategy and a coherent set of positions and priorities. Civil society, too, played an important role in providing ideas and expertise, helping to develop strategies, and keeping up political pressure in some of the key countries. The diplomatic skills of the Algerian President, Abdallah Baali, also played a part, as he refused to accept failure as an option. Undoubtedly, the weapon states felt under pressure to make stronger commitments than before, in order both to reinforce a non-proliferation regime shaken by the South Asian nuclear tests and to reassure and appease the non-nuclear states, many of which were critical of the weapon states' bad faith after achieving the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995.

The successful outcome will send a necessary signal to India and Pakistan, who may have been hoping for the conference to collapse in acrimony, as it has done on three previous occasions. Moreover, the NPT parties used strong language in denouncing the South Asian nuclear tests and underscored that "such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon state status or any special status whatsoever."

But behind all the late night meetings and fine-print negotiations, what have the weapon states actually agreed to? The unequivocal undertaking reflects the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals, delinked from general and complete disarmament. That is important. After considerable watering down, however, the practical steps are couched as aspirations and principles, with nothing specific, and there are no target dates or timetables for achieving any of the objectives.

The conference was a much-needed success, but its impact must not be exaggerated. Diplomacy can set the standards and expectations, but it will take concerted political will to translate the words adopted at the

2000 NPT conference into concrete actions towards the real and total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The 2000 NPT Conference has built on the decisions of 1995, providing even better tools to hold the weapon states more accountable, but it is now time to set a date for the

accomplishment of these pledges.

*Johnson is the executive director of the Acronym Institute in Britain.*

For the first time in the history of the NPT, a session was convened specifically to allow nongovernmental organizations

attending the recent review conference in New York to speak directly to government officials from NPT Parties.

Two delegations from Japan - one from Hiroshima, headed by Deputy Mayor Koshi Morimoto, and Nagasaki, led by Mayor Ichio Ito - participated in the session and held meetings with Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament, Abdallah Baali, the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN, who was appointed president of the review conference, and representatives of other NGOs.

Baali made the welcome gesture of chairing the NGO session, pointing to the importance of allowing NGO representatives to speak formally to NPT conference delegates for the first time.

Fifteen NGO representatives spoke at the session. They had been selected from countries around the world for their commitment to speaking up for the interests of civil society. With the exception of the opening and closing comments, and an opening address by Ito, 12 representatives spoke on the following themes: 1) nuclear disarmament 2) ballistic missile defense 3) regional proliferation and universality in South Asia 4) regional proliferation and universality in the Middle East 5) research and development 6) deterrence 7) law 8) article IV and alternative energy sources 9) health and environment 10) indigenous testimony on the nuclear age 11) the need for the abolition of nuclear weapons from a Russian perspective and 12) the personal responsibility of scientists.

In his role as a member of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City Solidarity, Ito said that he hoped that the present NPT review conference would blaze a trail to the abolition of nuclear weapons and assured that these weapons would not be carried into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The vast majority of the people in attendance remained at the

## NGO Involvement Enhances Value of the Review Conference Outcome

By Masamichi Kamiya

session throughout its three-hour duration. Hopefully, the voices raised not only by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also by other NGO

representatives, will resonate with governments and lead to the early abolition of nuclear weapons. According to the United Nations, 141 NGOs had registered at the review conference as of May 5, a sure sign of the level of interest in the event.

There seem to be three reasons why NGOs were given the opportunity to speak at the review conference. First, they had lobbied assiduously for the opportunity to take part in the conference. Second, governments are more inclined than before to take on board the views of NGOs. Finally, at international conferences in the 1990s, the methodology of oral presentations given by NGO members set the standard for similar presentations. For instance, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 and the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 all featured impressive input from NGOs.

The final document adopted at the recent NPT review conference can be considered the kind of roadmap the world desperately needs vis a vis nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this regard, the final document of the review conference can be seen not simply as a culmination of past efforts but as a starting point for the acceleration of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation.

If the messages contained in the NPT final document are interpreted this way, we are bound to find the right route along which to achieve our objectives. Whether the roadmap will be used properly will depend on how both governments and NGOs perform their roles.

*Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI*

## New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Philosophy: an Example for Others

Dr. Kate Dewes, an expert in non-nuclear security policy from New Zealand, and her husband, retired Royal Navy Commander Robert Green, gave a workshop on nuclear issues at the Hiroshima Peace Institute on March 14. Green is Chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project, whose actions led the International Court of Justice to pronounce in an unprecedented Advisory Opinion on July 8, 1996, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal. About 20 people, including researchers and members of nongovernmental organizations, attended the workshop.

In her presentation, titled "New Zealand's nuclear-free policy," Dewes explained the process by which the country, which fell under the U.S. nuclear umbrella when it became a signatory to ANZUS in 1951, had transformed itself into a nuclear-free state.

The anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand gathered pace in the late 1950s after Strontium 90 was detected in women's breast milk. The presence of the substance was attributed to nuclear tests carried out in the Pacific Ocean by Britain and the United States. Some years later, as France continued underground testing in Moruroa, New Zealand's anti-nuclear movement, with women at its forefront, was successful in influencing the policies of the then Labour government of Prime Minister David Lange. The French government's terrorist bombing of Greenpeace's anti-nuclear ship *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland coincided in 1985 with the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. In 1987, with New Zealand public opinion having hardened against nuclear weapons and nuclear power as a result of these developments

and the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, Lange's administration passed the Nuclear-Free Act and withdrew from the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Dewes praised the role of civic movements in realizing a nuclear-free New Zealand, as well as in promoting the concept of a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone. She was encouraged by campaigns by similar movements calling for Japan to leave the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the near future.

In a presentation titled "Non-nuclear strategies for Japan," Green said he had been encouraged by the Tokyo Forum report, which recognized the efforts of NGOs and the countries of the New Agenda Coalition.

He was critical, however, of Japan's security policy because it depends on a nuclear deterrent provided by the United States. "Nuclear deterrence stimulates hostility, and in order to justify nuclear deterrence and the nuclear umbrella, we hear from the Japanese government that there is a threat from North Korea," Green said, adding that Japan should rely on the United States solely for conventional military support.

Green also called for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and a decision by the United States not to deploy a theater missile defense (TMD) system in Japan or Taiwan. Green's recently published book, *The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence - A Primer for Safer Security Strategies*, features a foreword by New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark. A Japanese version will be published in November 2000.

*By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI*

# HPI Launches Disarmament Project

Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) launched the Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century in April 2000. To kick start the two-year project, led by Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, HPI held an inaugural meeting on April 14 featuring experts on nuclear disarmament - who are also part of the project - from universities and research institutes in Hiroshima, Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and other cities in Japan.

The project will examine possible means of carrying out nuclear disarmament in light of the decisions made at the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in New York from April 24 to May 19.

At further meetings, to be held, in principle, once a month, members of the project will give presentations on their specific research fields. There are also plans to invite non-member specialists in related fields, including journalists, policy makers and NGO members, to participate in discussions and give presentations. The project will also seek periodical written comment on workshop discussions and reports from specialists overseas.

The project plans to issue an interim report at the end of its first year consisting of essays written by members. Toward the end of the second year, the project will release a comprehensive report on issues associated with nuclear disarmament in the 21st century, including papers written by non-member specialists from Japan and overseas.

The project was set up as part of HPI's work on four major research themes - The process of abolishing nuclear weapons and related issues - announced in July 1998, and is the successor to the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which was cosponsored by HPI and the Japan Institute of International Affairs. At the meeting on April 14, members exchanged views regarding the evaluation of the Report of the Tokyo Forum made by various specialists around the world.

Prior to the launch of the project, HPI invited Kurosawa to make a

presentation on the prospects for the NPT Review Conference at a workshop on March 28. More than 20 researchers, graduate students and journalists from Hiroshima, Tokyo and Osaka attended the workshop.

As part of the project's activities, HPI plans to hold an international symposium titled "International Symposium on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century" on Saturday, July 29, at the International Conference Center in Hiroshima.

*By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI*

## Members of the project

### Project leader

*Mitsuru Kurosawa*, professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

### Other members

*Tadaaki Joh*, professor of law, Hiroshima Shudo University

*Masahiko Asada*, professor of law, Kyoto University

*Osamu Yoshida*, associate professor, Hiroshima University

*Yoko Ogashiwa*, associate professor, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University

*Naoki Kamimura*, associate professor, Hiroshima City University

*Hirofumi Tosaki*, research fellow, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs

*Masamichi Kamiya*, visiting research fellow, Hiroshima Peace Institute

*Kazumi Mizumoto*, associate professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute (coordinator)

*Nobumasa Akiyama*, research associate, Hiroshima Peace Institute (sub coordinator)

## Prospects for the NPT Review Conference: Kurosawa Addresses HPI Workshop

Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, addressed an HPI-sponsored open workshop titled "Prospects and Tasks for the NPT Review Conference" on March 28 prior to the review conference in New York.

In April, HPI launched *The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century* to clarify the major issues likely to arise at the review conference, and to examine the future progress of nuclear disarmament once the conference is over.

Kurosawa began by explaining the characteristics of the Review Conference as stipulated in Article VI, Paragraph 3 of the NPT, followed by an overview of the progress made between the first conference in 1975 and the fourth conference in 1990. He said the fundamental objective of the review conference is to check the progress of nuclear disarmament and the contents of parties' obligations to ensure that moves toward disarmament stipulated Article VI are made in good faith.

Referring to the previous review conference in 1995, Kurosawa explained that the decision to indefinitely extend the treaty was based on the adoption of two documents, "Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty" and "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament."

Regarding this year's conference, Kurosawa expressed concern over the predicted deadlock in discussions of the Main Committee I, which deals with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He said the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the early start of fissile material cut-off (FMCT) negotiations, the progress of START talks between the United States and Russia, unilateral efforts to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia, and the development of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) - all of which were included in "Principles and Objectives" at the 1995 conference - would be included again in this year's final document.

Kurosawa described as "severe" several unresolved issues surrounding the conference, such as the impasse in the START process, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the rejection of CTBT ratification by the U.S. Senate, friction between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China.

Afterward, participants, including researchers and graduate students, asked questions about the repercussions for nuclear disarmament of the U.S. Missile Defense plan, Japan's role at the NPT conference, and nuclear development in Israel. "Nuclear non-proliferation itself is not the aim, but only the means toward nuclear disarmament," Kurosawa said.

*By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI*

# East Timor Refugee Crisis Proof of Need for Recovery Plan

By Misa Fukunaga



Relief goods are unloaded from a helicopter in a mountainous area of East Timor.

At the end of October 1999, after a brief respite following the completion of an assignment repatriating refugees in Kosovo, I was asked by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to participate in the repatriation of refugees in East Timor. Southeast Asia, where East Timor is located, holds special memories for me, as I went to Cambodia for the first time in 1993 to engage in work related to peacekeeping activities.

The refugee problem in East Timor arose from the military conflict between pro-independence and pro-integration factions following a referendum on independence for East Timor on Aug. 30, 1999. When the UN announced that the people of East Timor had voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, pro-integration militia calling for unification with Indonesia, together with sections of the Indonesian security forces, conducted a campaign of violence against people who favored independence. Most of the territory's residents were forced to leave their homes, more than half of them fleeing to neighboring West Timor.

Houses were burned down, and residents accused of being supporters of independence were set upon, and in some cases, massacred. This madness and chaos continued until the UN approved military intervention by the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), centered on the Australian military.

At the time I arrived in East Timor after INTERFET and the United Nations had already secured the region and just as the latter was establishing an administrative system for the area that would stay in place during the transition to full independence.


The UN Security Council granted permission to establish the East Timor UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on Oct. 25, 1999. The organization was formed to oversee the re-establishment of safety, law and order in the region, the establishment of a provisional administration, and the restoration of basic standards of living through humanitarian assistance and aid during the transition to independence. UNTAET comprised a peacekeeping force of 7,500 personnel, including military observers, 1,000 administrators (as of January 2000), and 950 civilian police (as of March 2000). A UN peacekeeping force was given responsibility for maintaining public safety.

As a UN organization, UNHCR is in charge of repatriating refugees, and providing assistance to others doing the same, though it does not fall under the auspices of UNTAET. True independence will not come to East Timor until the repatriation of refugees is complete. The United Nations is responsible for repatriating refugees and restoring the region's security. International NGOs are also assisting residents, mainly in and around the capital, Dili.

My work began in Oekusi, a small, isolated region on the northwestern coast of the island of Timor. Oekusi's isolation dates back to the days when East Timor was a Portuguese territory. INTERFET arrived in Oekusi on Oct. 27, 1999, its final destination in East Timor. After learning of the forces' arrival, people who had hidden in nearby mountains came out of hiding. UNHCR established an office in the region in mid-November.

Most of the population in the area (Oekusi), estimated to number 54,000 at the time of voting, were forcibly driven from their homes. Even now, about 10,000 remain in West Timor. There were virtually no violent incidents prior to the referendum in the area in which I was working. But as the day of the vote arrived, private militias stepped up their activities, eventually destroying 98 percent of the area's homes.

For three months from Dec. 4 to the end of February, I was in charge of repatriating refugees and assisting returnees by, among other things,



distributing aid and monitoring people's living conditions. I began this work just as the rainy season began. As the region is mountainous, the condition of the roads worsened, making it difficult to repatriate people to their homes for some

time. However, whenever I witnessed people returning safely to their villages and tearfully embracing relatives, with expressions of relief and smiles on their faces, I felt keenly aware of the importance of assisting refugees.

The local office in Oekusi had a permanent international staff of between two and four people that included a French official dispatched from the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, a Dutch person and a UN volunteer from Bangladesh. Each member of the staff had experience of assisting refugees in conflict zones. The local staff totaled seven people, including drivers, all of whom were former refugees of evacuees. From early morning until evening, the office staff toured the area in four-wheel drive vehicles.

Our office was a local government building loaned to us by UNTAET that had been badly damaged in the conflict. During my stay, the building had no roof, windows or doors, with protection from the elements coming in the form of a plastic sheet. Later, however, as rebuilding got under way, the building was supplied with an electricity generator and perhaps became the most comfortable structure in Oekusi. The building became a resting place for us and members of other international organizations.

There remains an almost palpable mistrust between Indonesia and East Timor. Most of the refugees staying in West Timor are uneasy about their living conditions and personal safety after repatriation. Furthermore, the East Timorese are skeptical about the motives of those who took refuge in West Timor, doubting whether they will help in rebuilding the area or securing its independence. Indeed, intimidation of refugees in West Timor by local militias has slowed the rate of repatriation.

Oekusi location made it difficult for many NGOs to get involved there, and even UNTAET's activities were at first affected by insufficient aid from the Dili headquarters. The region, surrounded by Indonesian territory, was forced to rely on sea or air shipments from Dili. This meant cooperation from INTERFET was indispensable. However, the areas under the jurisdiction of the UN and of INTERFET differed, and we therefore had a difficult time securing assistance. INTERFET saw its most important task as being that of maintaining law and order. The repatriation of refugees was way down on its list of priorities. On the other hand, there would have been no humanitarian activities immediately after the conflict had it not been for the cooperation of a military force.

It has been nearly eight years since I first became involved in post-conflict recovery in places such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now East Timor. I have always been struck by a desire to share the ideas of peace and recovery with people who have suffered as a result of war. My work has included assisting voting and democratization, helping repatriate refugees, and extending humanitarian assistance. But these activities are just part of the overall quest to rebuild and rehabilitate these war-torn regions and countries. Of greatest importance is finding a way of linking recovery assistance with development and the establishment of peace.

When conflict breaks out in impoverished countries, it interferes with their sustainable development. The crux of the matter is shortening the time required to move from an initial period of emergency humanitarian assistance to the process of long-term recovery. Major aid-giving nations, in addition to the United Nations, must hammer out concrete plans for recovery in former conflict zones. On a personal level, I hope to continue working with people faced with the daily struggle of living amid conflict, and whose desire is simply for peace.

*Fukunaga is a former field officer at the UNHCR office in Oekusi. She also worked as a staff member at UNTAC's election management in Cambodia; at UNDP's representative office in Rwanda; at UNDP's representative office in Kirghiz and at UNHCR's Pristina office. She was also involved in election supervision in Bosnia, and acted as an observer during general elections in Cambodia. She is the author of "An Energetic Diary of Cambodia."*

# The Kosovo Conflict and Italy

## National Interests in Humanitarian Assistance

By Nobumasa Akiyama

Given its history and geographical location in the Adriatic Sea, opposite the Balkan Peninsula, it was hardly surprising that Italy became involved in last summer's conflict in Kosovo. The Italian government made a difficult decision in allowing NATO aircraft to use bases on its soil, since its constitution prohibits participation in wars. In addition, anti-U.S. sentiment in Italy had heightened after 20 people died when a U.S. military aircraft struck a ropeway line in February 1998. After the NATO military campaign began, Italy, faced with public opposition to the bombing and a desire to play a leadership role in southeast Europe, was among the first Western European countries to call for a negotiated settlement.

Of greatest concern to Italy was the exodus of refugees from Kosovo. The Italian people believed that allowing a large number of refugees to cross the Italian border would present a challenge to the country's national security, in addition to posing some difficult humanitarian questions. Indeed, the Italian government's very survival hinged on keeping the influx of refugees to a bare minimum.

The Italian government acted with appropriate haste. On March 29, five days after NATO began bombing Belgrade, the government declared a national state of emergency, and dispatched the naval transport vessel, San Marco, to Albania carrying tents, sleeping bags, buses, ambulances and Red Cross personnel. The fact that the Albanian government did not issue an emergency statement requesting aid until April 3, and that the UNHCR increased the number of personnel it dispatched the Albania / Kosovo border on April 2, illustrates just how swift Italy's response was.

Operation Rainbow (Missione Arcobaleno), provided refugees with assistance and coordinated personnel, from soldiers to NGO volunteers. The Department of Civil Protection (DPC), a body belonging to the Prime Minister's office that oversees disaster-relief activities, formulated relief activities. The DPC was set up in 1992 after a volcanic eruption near Naples in 1980 prompted discussion about improving the country's response to disasters.

The organization's work involves foreseeing, predicting and preventing natural disasters. It is also involved in various inter-organizational aid and recovery activities. In the case of natural disasters, it supervises and coordinates the activities of firefighters, the police, the military, the Red Cross, as well as research institutes and volunteer groups. To date, it has been involved in 55 domestic and 24 overseas relief operations, including the January 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake in Japan.

In Kosovo, the military and volunteers were participating in an overseas mission together for the first time. The military was needed to maintain order and to support transportation work. Volunteer groups registered with the DPC now number about 1,770. About 6,200 people worked as volunteers in Kosovo during the campaign. It was also the first time that the DPC had coordinated overseas volunteer activities.

Operation Rainbow initiated an impressive fund-raising campaign in Italy, and as a result, raised a total of 128.6 billion lira in contributions and received a total of 2,100 containers of supplies. Throughout Albania, 18 refugee-aid facilities (10 of which were refugee camps) were built, housing about 30,000 Kosovar refugees and providing about 30,000 people with relief goods.

Italy's quick response to the Kosovo crisis is rooted in its experience coping with refugees during the Albanian crisis of 1997. At that time, about 27,000 refugees crossed the sea to Italy, which simply was not prepared to handle them and experienced problems as a result. In March that year, an Italian naval vessel collided with a boat loaded with refugees, 80 of whom drowned after the boat sank.

Italy played a key role in the multinational army organized by European countries to transport relief goods. Memories of Italy's

annexation of Albania during both World Wars gave rise to strong domestic opposition to any military involvement in Kosovo. Nevertheless, Italy dispatched of troops to handle the refugee crisis and to fulfill its "international responsibility."

Although Operation Rainbow proved effective in providing aid to refugees and in preventing a further influx into Italy, several problems remained unsolved. When providing aid activities for Kosovar refugees in Albania - a third party - Italy experienced difficulties maintaining lines of communication with local authorities in the war-torn province. At the time, Kosovo's local governments were rife with political corruption and misadministration, and its central government appeared unable to bring them to heel. Under those circumstances, aid activities could not be left to administrative bodies in Albania. At the same time, however, Italy did not want to be seen to be infringing on the sovereignty of the host country through its aid activities.

Other issues surfaced that were associated with coordinating aid activities among countries and international organizations. A report titled "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis," which was published in February 2000 by UNHCR, talks of a lack of coordination between bilateral aid activities and those of international organizations such as UNHCR, and the competition between those activities. Italy, for instance, made a Cabinet-level decision to send a mission to Kosovo without consulting UNHCR. Italy was also critical of what it saw as UNHCR's tardy response to the refugee crisis. On the other hand, some reportedly were unhappy that the Italian government had proceeded with its own aid activities without sending relief goods to NGOs already on the ground in Kosovo.

It was also pointed out that the goodwill of the people of Italy might not have been translated into practical help. According to a media report, a large amount of relief goods contributed by the public piled up at the port of Bari instead of being delivered to the refugees. (An official in charge of the goods said the government and NGOs had agreed to forward the remaining supplies to other locations on Aug. 2, two days before the refugee camps were closed, and that, after taking into account relief supplies sent to Turkey in the aftermath of last year's earthquakes, only 1.2% of the total remaining supplies were not utilized.)

The managers of the refugee camps were accused of diverting aid supplies to the Albanian Mafia, an accusation that resulted in the demotion of the DPC minister and mounting suspicion of the department's domestic aid activities.

Most people doubt Italy would be able to adopt the same strategy should a similar situation arise again overseas. Rotating volunteers and taking care of them once they are long distances away is not easy (In Kosovo, volunteers worked for short periods before being replaced.) Governments' primary task is gauging the level of the threat posed to its own country by a crisis overseas. They also have to give careful thought to the political ramifications of sending troops overseas.

After the Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Japanese government's crisis management system was harshly criticized, as was the level of communication and coordination between governmental bodies. Tokyo is cautious about sending Self-Defense Force troops overseas to take part in disaster-relief missions, a task they perform very well on home soil. It may not be possible to directly apply the "Italian model" to Japan, but it nonetheless serves as a useful example of how to deal with the problems of offering humanitarian assistance.

(Note) This paper was based on research carried out in Brussels and Rome in March 2000 while the author was participating in the European Union Visitors Programme.

*Akiyama is a research associate at HPI*

# DIARY

March 31, 2000 - May 31, 2000

March 6-16

Nobumasa Akiyama participates in the European Union Visitors Programme in Brussels and Rome.

March 9-10

Kazumi Mizumoto attends an international symposium, "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation: A Challenge for 21st Century," at Kojimachi Kaikan, Tokyo, organized by the Study Group on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy.

March 14

A workshop on nuclear issues is held at Hiroshima Peace Institute featuring addresses by Kate Dewes, co-chair of the governing Labour Party's Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, and Robert Green, a former British Royal Navy Commander.

March 22

Mizumoto delivers a lecture on current international nuclear situation as part of "What we should know about Hiroshima," an awareness project organized by the Hiroshima UNESCO Association, at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

March 28

A workshop titled "Prospects for the NPT Review Conference" is held at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, featuring a keynote speech by Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

March 31

Mizumoto attends the "19th Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues" held at and organized by the Tokyo Foundation.

April 7

Mizumoto attends a workshop, "Exploring Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies: The Case of the Nuclear Umbrella," organized by the NIRA in Tokyo.

April 10-June 10

Akiyama participates in the Henry L. Stimson Center Confidence-Building Measures Fellowship Program in Washington, D.C.

April 14

HPI's "Disarmament in the 21st Century," project team hold their first meeting.

April 17

Masamichi Kamiya attends a meeting of the Center for Preventive Diplomacy, held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.

April 23-May 5

Kamiya visits New York to observe the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

April 24-27, May 15-20

Akiyama visits New York to observe the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

April 28-May 11

Mizumoto visits New York and Washington, D.C., to conduct research into the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

April 28

Mizumoto and Akiyama report on Japan's nuclear non-proliferation policy at a roundtable discussion at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.

May 17

Mizumoto attends a workshop, "Exploring Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies: The Case of the Nuclear Umbrella," organized by the NIRA in Tokyo.

May 18

Mizumoto delivers a lecture at a meeting of Hiroshima Bar Association.

May 20

Mizumoto attends the annual convention of the Japan Association for International Relations at the Nagoya Congress Center.

May 22-24

Akiyama participates in Confidence-Building Measures/Energy Working Group Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

May 26

HPI's "Disarmament in the 21st Century" project team hold their second meeting.

May 27-28

Mizumoto attends the second annual conference of the Japan Association for United Nations Studies at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo.

- Visitors to HPI -

March 12

Ambassador Abdallah Baali, president of the Sixth NPT Review Conference, the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN

March 23

Silvia Lidia Gonzalez, a researcher at Sophia University in Tokyo

March 28

Masafumi Kaneko, visiting fellow at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies

April 13

Takeshi Kamiyama, director of research coordination at the Japan Institute of International Affairs

## International Symposium on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

Hiroshima Peace Institute will organize an international symposium on nuclear disarmament in Hiroshima on July 29, 2000. The symposium, which is open to the public, will feature an analysis of discussions and decisions at the recent NPT review conference in New York, and will examine the prospects for nuclear disarmament in the coming century. Experts in disarmament, foreign policy, international law and national security from governmental and non-governmental bodies will serve as panelists.

Theme: "Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century"

Panelists:

<i>Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa</i>	Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
<i>Amb. Seiichiro Noboru</i>	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Conference on Disarmament
<i>Dr. Hiromichi Umabayashi</i>	President of the Peace Depot
<i>Ms. Rebecca Johnson</i>	Executive Director of the Acronym Institute
<i>Dr. Cathleen S. Fisher</i>	Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center

Date: July 29, 2000 1:30 p.m. ~ 4:30 p.m.

Venue: The "Himawari" room in the second basement (B2) of the International Conference Center, Hiroshima

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS is a newsletter published by the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

Readers are encouraged to submit comments or articles for inclusion in HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS.

Articles should contain a maximum of 1,200 words, and may be edited for length and clarity. Submissions can be sent by fax, mail or, preferably, by e-mail. They should be accompanied by the writer's name, address, telephone number and profession.

Unfortunately, submissions cannot be returned.

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