

Overcoming confrontation—Europe eyes new millennium of peace

Former foreign ministers from France and Poland, a leading German journalist and the current German Ambassador to Japan spoke of the importance of confronting past wrongs, at both grassroots and government levels, and of forming new partnerships, at a symposium held in Hiroshima on October 7, 1999. At the symposium, titled "Reconciliation in Europe: The road to regional cooperation and security," four panelists from countries with a tragic history of belligerence toward one another explained how the people of those countries had overcome lingering mutual distrust. The symposium, attended by about 250 people, was sponsored by the International House of Japan with support from the Hiroshima Peace Institute and other organizations. Mikio Kato, executive director of International House, acted as moderator. (See pages 4-5 for summaries of the speeches.)

Forum report a solid basis for nuclear disarmament

Experts air views on proposals at Hiroshima symposium

People from Japan, the United States and France called on nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states to act on the recommendations of the Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at a symposium at the International Conference Center in Hiroshima on September 18. Speaking under the title "Endeavors for the abolition of nuclear weapons—What the Tokyo Forum has achieved and what still remains to be done," five experts, including a cochairman and two other members of the forum, offered analyses of the international climate regarding nuclear weapons and commented on the contents of the report. Most of them urged the international community to take steps toward realizing the report's recommendations. The event, which was sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Institute, was attended by about 200 people. (See pages 2-3 for summaries of the speeches.)

Tokyo Forum Report draws praise, criticism at United Nations

Concrete steps are desperately needed for shared objectives

By Masamichi Kamiya

The 54th U.N. General Assembly was inaugurated on September 14, 1999. The recommendations of the Tokyo Forum Report were discussed at the general debate of the General Assembly, held from September 21 to October 2, and also at the general debate of its First Committee, which met from October 11 to 22. Following is a summary of discussions at the two forums.

A speech by Masahiko Komura, the then Japanese Foreign Minister, was one of the most encouraging made by government representatives at the general assembly debate. He said, "Japan would like to actively consult with other countries with a view to implementing the meaningful recommendations contained in the (Tokyo Forum) report."

At the First Committee debate, several countries referred to the report. The representative from Myanmar said, "The report of the Tokyo Forum, which outlined a range of important practical measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, is welcome." His Indonesian colleague said, "The report of the Tokyo Forum has warned of the continuing dangers posed by (the possession of) nuclear armaments and has projected its vision of how to resolve nuclear issues." The representative from Croatia said, "I concur with the Tokyo Forum conclusion that there is an urgent need for

concerted action and a realistic dialogue so that recent setbacks can be reversed."

Negative comments, however, were heard from North Korea at the U.N. Security Council on September 3. A statement dated August 30, made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman via the country's permanent mission in New York, read: "The Tokyo Forum has not been recognized internationally as it was cooked up by Japan to seek to cover up its ambition" to develop nuclear arms. Meanwhile, Shen Guofang, ambassador of the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, said in a statement read out at the First Committee on October 13: "The Report of the Tokyo Forum, for instance, is a report with quite lopsided and biased view. Many of its arguments...deviate from the purposes of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation."

A representative from Japan to the First Committee said privately that U.N. member states were interested in the report, even though few of them had made official comments on it, adding that the measures envisioned by the report as a means of achieving nuclear disarmament were appropriate. Proof of this can be seen in a change that was made to a draft resolution for nuclear disarmament presented this year by Myanmar to the First Committee with the support of the Non-Aligned Countries. The draft, like the Tokyo Forum Report, made no mention of the need for "a specific timeframe," a condition that had appeared in all previous resolutions until 1998. It may not be wrong to say that even the Non-Aligned Countries, which have long demanded nuclear disarmament to take place within a specified timeframe, are now beginning to recognize the weakness of such demands, and are apt to acknowledge the importance of a pragmatic, incremental approach to nuclear disarmament.

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- Yasushi Akashi* Former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, cochairman of the Tokyo Forum
- Ryukichi Imai* Distinguished fellow of the Institute for International Policy Studies, a member of the Tokyo Forum
- Therese Delpech* Director of the Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, a member of the Tokyo Forum
- Thomas Graham, Jr.* President of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security

Coordinated by Prof. Toshiaki Mogami of the International Christian University



Toshiaki Mogami

Mogami is a professor at the International Christian University. He is also a member of the Academic Council of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.

The report mentions the persistent belief among some countries in nuclearism, and makes recommendations on the assumption that immediate action should be taken that is effective and realistic. Some of the recommendations emphasize the importance of a multilateral approach to disarmament.

Yet I am aware of a fair amount of criticism against the report. The forum was initiated following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan last year, with the intention of responding with urgent recommendations. So, while putting aside the problems of the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, the forum nevertheless discussed ways of putting pressure on countries such as India and Pakistan, whose behavior threatens the treaty. Another concern is the report's reliance on gradual solutions to even the most urgent problems.

For example, the Tokyo Forum proposed that the United States and Russia reduce warheads deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,000 each, but did not set a timetable. There is a great deal of anxiety over when the two countries will actually attain this goal. According to the theory of nuclear deterrence, some countries regard nuclear weapons as a necessary evil, while others see them as a good thing. The recommendations made by the Canberra Commission in 1996 contained clear criticism of the theory of nuclear deterrence, and took as their starting point the idea that nuclear weapons are an absolute evil. The Tokyo Forum report searched for a way to abolish nuclear weapon while steering a path between the aforementioned views. But one day we will have to give up the idea that nuclear weapons have positive qualities. We need to reconsider the purpose of nuclear weapons if we are to succeed in bringing about their complete eradication.



Ryukichi Imai

Imai is a distinguished fellow of the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo, and a member of the Tokyo Forum. He is a former Ambassador of Japan to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador to Mexico and a member of the governing board at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

From 1960s through the beginning of the 1980s, the United States and the former Soviet Union built up huge nuclear arsenals. Although a movement for nuclear abolition existed, little was known in Japan, at least about how to actually dismantle and dispose of existing nuclear weapons. Our work should continue until nuclear weapons are eliminated

The Australian government kick-started the movement for the abolition of nuclear weapons with the establishment of the Canberra Commission in 1995, and Japan took up that initiative and set up the Tokyo Forum. The number of strategic warheads possessed by the United States and Russia numbered about 80,000 in the 1980s. Under

At the Tokyo Forum we discussed not only global disarmament but also regional disarmament, focusing on South Asia, the Middle East and Northeast Asia. As part of the process toward nuclear abolition, the forum proposed that the United States and Russia reduce warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,000 each, and that the five nuclear weapon states adopt a multilateral approach to disarmament. The eventual aim is to bring the number of nuclear weapons down to zero. In this sense, the report is very ambitious. One of the most significant features of the Tokyo Forum was that it squarely grappled with nuclear problems in China. India carried out nuclear tests to gain recognition as a global power. At the Tokyo Forum, there was a common anxiety that more countries might follow India's way of thinking and aim to develop a nuclear capability. The report addresses, in minute detail, the issues of nuclear non-proliferation as well as a commitment to the NPT regime by non-nuclear-weapon states is a necessary condition for nuclear-weapon states to abolish their weapons. Japan, while preciously guarding its three non-nuclear principles, at the same time depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We should consider whether to make that umbrella smaller, or turn what is an independent umbrella into a universal one. Any efforts toward disarmament should aim at filling the gap between anti-nuclear principles and the protection offered by the nuclear umbrella. In this regard, the report's recommendations are constructive, and represent the first step toward a realistic disarmament methodology. Appeals to individual governments should be made on the basis of the report. I believe the approach suggested by the Tokyo Forum—which combines the wisdom of NGOs and experts from around the world—will be very influential in the future.



Yasushi Akashi

Akashi is the former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and co-chairman of the Tokyo Forum. He is also the former U.N. Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs.

Report a first step toward realistic disarmament methodology. It holds that the NPT regime by non-nuclear-weapon states is a necessary condition for nuclear-weapon states to abolish their weapons. Japan, while preciously guarding its three non-nuclear principles, at the same time depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We should consider whether to make that umbrella smaller, or turn what is an independent umbrella into a universal one. Any efforts toward disarmament should aim at filling the gap between anti-nuclear principles and the protection offered by the nuclear umbrella. In this regard, the report's recommendations are constructive, and represent the first step toward a realistic disarmament methodology. Appeals to individual governments should be made on the basis of the report. I believe the approach suggested by the Tokyo Forum—which combines the wisdom of NGOs and experts from around the world—will be very influential in the future.

the START process, they began reducing weapons numbers for economic, rather than humanitarian reasons. Although each country has reduced the number of weapons it possesses to about 3,000, the problem of how to dismantle nuclear weapons in the coming century has yet to be solved. It is said that a maximum of 2,000 weapons (strategic and/or tactical) can be dismantled per year under the most prudent conditions. There also needs to be discussion on the role of nuclear energy in the 21st century. At the COP 3 climate-change conference in 1997, countries agreed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Given this commitment, reducing nuclear power generation would appear difficult. The issues of nuclear disarmament and energy should be discussed together in the future. We also have to address the problem of contamination by radioactive waste. So how do we bring about the realization of nuclear weapon-free world? To find the answer, we must urge Japan and the rest of the international community not to be content with the outcome so far, but to continue where the Tokyo Forum Report left off and make concerted efforts toward total nuclear abolition.

What the Tokyo Forum has achieved and what still remains to be done

The world faced a choice between the assured danger of proliferation or the challenges of nuclear disarmament, and ostensibly chose the latter. However, developments over the years, and the continuing inability of nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to negotiate further reductions in nuclear arsenals seem to be pushing the international community back toward the former option. Several important steps need to be taken if the world is to be moved back onto the right track. The NWS should agree to a no-first-use policy. This would emphasize their commitment to the negative security assurances and would send a firm message to would-be proliferators that the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not enhance the security or greatness of the state. Nuclear non-proliferation is not the preserve of the NWS. For example, all but one NWS member of NATO abstained on a General Assembly Resolution sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition calling for achieving a nuclear-free world. Similarly, due largely to the efforts of Canada and Germany, NATO agreed at its April summit meeting to conduct a review of its nuclear doctrine that

Reducing political value of nuclear weapons the best path toward stability

could result in the consideration by the alliance of the adoption of a no-first-use policy. Efforts such as these are ways in which determined non-nuclear-weapon states can work toward reducing the political value of nuclear weapons. The Tokyo Forum correctly concludes that without significant reductions in existing arsenals, nuclear nonproliferation efforts are unlikely to succeed. Drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world and strictly limiting their role solely to deterring their use by others, coupled with practical steps by NNWS to bolster the nonproliferation regime, is the best path toward security and stability in the next century.



Thomas Graham, Jr. Graham is president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security in the United States. He served as the special representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, leading U.S. government efforts to achieve indefinite extension of the NPT and urge conclusion of CTBT negotiations in Geneva.

Questions & Answers



Therese Delpech Delpech is director of Strategic Affairs at the Atomic Energy Commission in France and a member of the Tokyo Forum. She is a former advisor to the French Prime Minister for politico-military affairs and a consultant to the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

One of the most significant features of the Tokyo Forum Report is that it faced up to regional and international security. Unlike most of its predecessors, the report develops a firmly grounded debate on international relations, recognizing that they should take precedence if the recommendations should have any impact in the real world. The original goal was to discuss ways to rebuild the international order of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament after the nuclear tests in South Asia. The report devotes additional analysis to two other crisis-hit regions that are causing concern: the Middle East and East Asia. Second, nuclear disarmament should be comprehensive and linked to other developments other than nuclear. The long-

neglected issue of tactical nuclear weapons was taken up and proposals for the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons were written in the report. Recommendations a vast improvement on existing policies Nuclear

disarmament should also be linked to other spheres of disarmament, in particular to missile proliferation, and to chemical and biological disarmament. Third, the report makes it clear that China should contribute to nuclear disarmament with deeds and not only with words, by, for example, improving transparency and accepting at least to commit itself not to increase its nuclear forces. The Tokyo Forum Report has been read in Europe. The recommendations go far beyond the scope of policies currently being pursued by nuclear-weapon states, but they give a direction to follow in order to improve the current situation.

Comments by Japanese speakers translated by Mika Harland and Eiko Matsushima, HPI staff members

Member of Audience : Do you think abolishing nuclear weapons—the sincerest wish of the people of Hiroshima—is impracticable?

Delpech : I can understand that for the people living in Hiroshima, nothing is acceptable but zero nuclear weapons. But in any view it is better to improve the present situation with appropriate steps than to have a general and abstract commitment to immediate elimination, which is not practicable and will remain empty words.

Member of Audience : The 15th paragraph of Part 4 of the Tokyo Forum report could be read to mean that nuclear weapons would deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction.

Graham : The report makes it clear that nuclear weapons should have one role and one role only, and that is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. And in order to make the pledges of no-first-use credible, it is important to have changes in nuclear doctrine which reserves the first use of nuclear weapons, and which overtly implies that nuclear weapons are politically and militarily valuable.

Delpech : The report is very cautious concerning no-first-use. It does say that commitments are seldom reliable in this field. The best way to ensure the additional reliability of this pledge is to withdraw and abandon tactical nuclear weapons, which could be battlefield arms.

Member of Audience : The Report says that the NPT Regime is in a critical situation. I think it attributes (that situation) to the lack of responsibility shown by nuclear-weapon states, which are parties to the NPT.

Akashi : The NPT rests on a core bargain between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. The Report emphasizes the role of nuclear-weapon states in achieving disarmament, especially the responsibility of the U.S. and Russia. Unless nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT throw all their energies into implementing Article 6 of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states' commitments to the NPT might be weakened.

Member of Audience : The Report mentions the early realization of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Why did not it refer to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia?

Akashi : Concerning a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, there would be far more difficult problems than in other nuclear weapon-free zones. In other zones, nuclear weapons do not exist and nuclear weapon states have not deployed any nuclear weapons in those areas. In Northeast Asia, China and Russia are nuclear-weapon states, and the U.S. has a nuclear potential in the area. So clearing the area of nuclear weapons is the first problem that needs solving. I think that is why we could not bring up in the report the issue of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region.

Delpech : Concerning Northeast Asia, the major problem would be about the scope of the nuclear weapon-free zone. What would be in particular the role of China? Also, in Northeast Asia, the priority for us was to get a denuclearized zone in the Korean Peninsula, or at least full implementation of NPT commitments and 1991 bilateral agreements.



Theo Sommer

Sommer is the publisher of Die Zeit magazine. He is also a regular contributor to Newsweek and The Yomiuri Shimbun. He is a former lecturer at the University of Hamburg and served as head of the planning staff under Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt during the Brandt administration.

Europe's history during the past 1,000 years has been a narrative of progress—from ignorance to the knowledge-based society, from destitution to affluence, from parochial concerns to global outreach. There is, however, a dark side to the story of Europe's past 1,000 years. The millennium, which is now drawing to an end, was one of almost uninterrupted internecine warfare. Many feared that Europe had reached the end of its history. Thanks to the wisdom of a handful of truly great leaders, things turned out quite differently. Statesmen decided to put Europe back on the map, not as warring rivals, but by creating a totally new Europe. Statesmen from France and Germany became close partners in a bold venture of reconciliation, and contributed to the cementing of the Franco-German relationship. We have been able

to become not only the core, but also the motor of progress in Europe. The common project of European integration has stabilized the Franco-German relationship. That special relationship is continuously lubricated by an abundance of meetings. I am confident that by focusing our ambition on Europe, we can likewise achieve reconciliation between Germany and

Poland. But this is not easy. In relations between the two, the Poles experienced agony at the hands of Germany for several hundred years. In 1945 the tables turned. Hundreds of thousands of Germans lost their lives during that turbulent time. The outbreak of the Cold War did not help. The old images of those who constituted the enemy were powerfully reinforced by the rhetoric of the East-West confrontation. There were, however, a number of important official moves—the German-Polish Treaty of 1970, and textbook conferences attended by German and Polish historians aimed at conveying an objective picture of the past to the young generation. And in 1950, the Oder-Neisse line was recognized as the border between Poland and Germany. Reconciliation is difficult, but all the necessary prerequisites are there. First of all, the Germans have faced up to their past. They did not close their eyes, their minds, and their hearts to the misdeeds committed by their fathers and grandfathers. Second, the European project provides to all our nations a framework within which we can live out our national destinies without giving offense to others. During the next three or four years, Poland's accession to the European Union will symbolize the end of 1,000 years of strife and confrontation.

1,000-year journey from confrontation to conciliation



Wladyslaw Bartoszewski

Bartoszewski was Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs from March to December 1995. Imprisoned at Auschwitz concentration camp during the war, he was a co-founder of the "Zegota" Council for Aid to Jews. He was also active in the Catholic underground organization, the Front for the Rebirth of Poland. He was twice imprisoned by the communists, and was later officially recognized as a victim of persecution.

During World War II, I was imprisoned as a political offender in the Auschwitz death camp, and given a tattoo identifying me as No. 4424. I was released after seven months, and joined the Resistance to help save the lives of Jews. In 1944, Poland was bombed on a massive scale, but I survived the bombings. Under these conditions, my hatred for Germany was a matter of course. I did not consider Germany a partner. I even did not think of reconciliation with Germany. But the time for peace did come. Poland

had been tortured by other countries and had experienced great hardship for many years. For example, when Stalin was in power, he manipulated the people psychologically. We wanted to lead our lives freely as human beings. Even at that time, some Poles did not think that German citizens were to blame for the crimes of the war. Why was it possible for them to think that way? The reason is that they understood Hitler's crimes had brought about the lengthy separation of several million Poles and Germans. However, this

Courage to confront truth makes reconciliation possible

SYMPOSIUM

Reconciliation The Road to Regional C

Participants

- Theo Sommer Publisher of Die Zeit, Germany
Wladyslaw Bartoszewski Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poland
Roland Dumas Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, France
Uwe Kaestner German Ambassador to Japan

Moderated by Mikio Kato Executive Director, the International House of Japan

Questions & Answers

Member of audience : Do you think it is possible for people to forgive others in any situation?

Bartoszewski : I cannot jump to conclusions. It depends on the situation, the generations and the nations involved. You have to think about the historical background and the relationship between nations. In unifying Europe (i.e. the formation of the European Union), we took the same actions as other nations. We had the same motivation for unification. It was a good chance to look for a way to co-exist. Despite differences in culture, it is important to have the same motivation and to cooperate with one another for better conditions.

Sommer : Europe showed that it is possible. In unifying Europe, it was important to have a common purpose with other nations and to make an effort to attain the same goals.

Member of audience : I think the relationship between Germany and France until the end of World War was similar to that between China and Japan. And in terms of the damage caused by the war, the relationship between Germany and Poland has something in common with that between Korea and Japan. What advice would you give Japan to establish closer ties with China and North and South Korea?

separation led to the emergence of a new society in which children had the opportunity to be educated in a different way and learn about the idea of reconciliation. Although it was not intended as a political remark, in 1965, when Poland was under communist rule, a Catholic bishop in Poland said, in reference to Germany, "We will forgive you. Please forgive us." Many Poles must have thought the same way. In Germany, the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and a new government was formed in Poland. In 1994, Roman Herzog, then president of the Federal Republic of Germany, apologized for the wrongs committed by Germans. In April 1995, I became the first Pole in German history to make a speech at the German Bundestag. As the Foreign Minister, I apologized on behalf of the Polish people for having Germans exiled, and for making them suffer terribly after the war. In the process of reconciliation, we not only overcame our hatred of Germany but also formed partnerships with France and Germany under the banner of NATO. In doing so, we resurrected the traditional relationship of the three Weimar countries of Germany, France and Poland. We need to search our conscience for the deeds we committed in the past. Great courage is necessary to tell the truth. I believe the spirit of truth will make reconciliation possible.

Reconciliation in Europe

Cooperation and Security

Dumas : Maybe the time is not ripe for that yet. But there are several measures that should be taken to improve the relationship. I believe, for example, it is important to make younger generations understand the concept of reconciliation.

Kato : Reconciliation in Europe was achieved by overcoming the hatred between former enemies. For a genuine reconciliation, we need people to be courageous, great leaders who are willing to make symbolic gestures in a sincere way. We have to ask ourselves whether Japan has had such attributes in the past.

Comments from the audience

[Excerpts]

"As residents of Hiroshima, we should think more about the meaning of the word 'reconciliation.' A Polish Catholic bishop once said: 'We will forgive you. Please forgive us.' I think such sentiments can form the basis of reconciliation."

—Toshihiko Hayashi of Hiroshima, in reply to an HPI questionnaire

"I realized the importance of apologizing and making symbolic gestures to advance the reconciliation process. As Japanese citizens living in Hiroshima, we should not only highlight the tragedy of war, but also the suffering we inflicted during the war. We need to form close relationships with other countries both by forgiving and by asking for forgiveness."

—Kenji Kawaguchi of Kure, in an e-mail to HPI


It is necessary for people in each country to make every effort and to study how we can turn the hate of the past into the reconciliation of the future. Not only leading figures in government but also citizens, prominent authors and artists have contributed to the advancement of the reconciliation process. Under the slogan "No reconciliation without truth," German and Polish historians have gathered materials and studied objective pictures of past wars and how they broke out. Reconciliation is like an architectural plan, in which people not only overcome the difficulties of the past but also build a common future. The young post-war generation accepted such a principle with enthusiasm: Europe! The European Coal and Steel community was established in 1952 under the concept that European countries would jointly control resources, such as coal and steel, which had hitherto been considered essential for wars. The same idea also led to the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community, which aimed to jointly develop nuclear energy. Later, that idea helped forge the European Economic Community and the EU, which is now open to Germany's eastern neighbors. Such major steps in the economic and political integration of Europe have enabled us to overcome boundary problems between Germany and Poland. A boundary in the Europe of the future would

Truth and reconciliation behind new Germany-Poland relationship

However many treaties and agreements diplomatic experts concluded, they could not avoid wars. For instance, after WWI, the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. People believed war would not happen again in Europe, but then WWII broke out. Therefore, they needed a different approach toward avoiding wars. Now, let me share the experiences of the French people after WWII. Rather than promoting reconciliation, people in France, I remember, wanted to take revenge on Germany. I was a young Dietman at the time, elected in a town that had suffered extraordinary torture as a result of the war. On top of that, my father had been shot dead by the Nazis after being taken prisoner, so I campaigned under the slogan, "Remember our victims. Settle their scores." Nevertheless, circumstances gradually changed, and new sentiments came to the fore, such as "Say goodbye to our hatred for old enemies. Wars are not only ill-fated but also foolish." People such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, De Gaulle and other high-ranking politicians advocated that idea, and showed the political will to realize reconciliation. They tried to promote the reconciliation process within the framework of a European community rather than directly with Germany. From the economic point of view, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was a good example. The ECSC enabled Germany and France to jointly control coal and steel, both necessary for sustaining a war. The ECSC was followed by similar organizations, culminating, today, in European Monetary Union. The people of Europe are now trying to build a flexible structure based on those principles in the form of the European Union. Symbolic gestures were also indispensable to the advancement of the reconciliation process. Polish people were genuinely touched when former chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Willy Brandt, bowed before the graves of fallen Polish soldiers in Warsaw. And the meeting between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand at the former battlefield of Verdun left a deep impression on the peoples of Germany and France. People around the world who witnessed those scenes on television saw more clearly the extent to which the attitude of the German people had changed than could be communicated by treaties and agreements.



Roland Dumas
Dumas was French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1988-1993. He is the former president of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs of the French National Assembly; Minister for European Affairs; spokesman for the French government and Minister for External Relations.



Uwe Kaestner
Kaestner is the former Director for Latin American Affairs at the German Foreign Ministry, Ambassador to South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho, Director for African Affairs and Director-General of Political Affairs, both at the German Foreign Ministry.

unite, not divide countries. The term "earthquake diplomacy" has been heard often recently, particularly since Turkey and Greece both experienced great earthquakes. When one was distressed, the other helped, despite their history of hostility toward each other. In Poland, the government outlawed the Solidarity workers' movement and proclaimed martial law. In response, Western countries imposed sanctions against Poland, but the German people sent relief goods to Polish people via churches. Nothing is more precious than help when a country is in great difficulties. Last, but not least, symbolic gestures are a prerequisite for advancing the reconciliation process. For example, on September 1 this year, German President Johannes Rau shook hands with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski on the site of the battleground where WWII had broken out 60 years ago. After the reunification of Germany, Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip visited Dresden and offered to contribute a crucifix to a church that British Air Force planes had destroyed during the war.

Translated from Japanese texts by Eiko Matsushima and Mika Harland, HPI staff members

Dialog key to improving political stability, security in Central Asia

By Nobumasa Akiyama

Four Japanese geologists and several Kyrgyz were abducted by Uzbek Islamic militants at the end of August 1999 in the southern part of Kyrgyz in Central Asia. The crisis came to an end when the Japanese hostages were freed on October 25. However, the process that led to their release taught us a great deal about the complexities of the region's political and security environments.

I visited Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in early October—not long before the crisis was resolved—and exchanged views with experts and government officials on security issues in Central Asia. In this report, I would like to make a brief investigation, based on the aforementioned discussions, on intraregional relations while paying close attention to the states' political differences, and to the ethnic and religious issues involved.

It is often said that Islamic extremism is the cause of political instability in the region. However, that alone does not paint a complete picture of relations between states, and the issues of ethnicity and religion. The group of Uzbek rebels that held the Japanese geologists and other hostages had fled to neighboring Tajikistan to escape an oppressive government back home. A closer look at this group, the object of a domestic game of political football in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, reveals the complexity and vulnerability of the region's political and security structures.

The independence acquired by Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to cross-border ethnic tensions. Former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had deliberately fragmented the region's land and people as part of his divide-and-rule policy. As a result, areas populated by Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik people intertwined to form a larger area that took in Fergana Province in Uzbekistan, Osh Oblast in Kyrgyz, and northern and central Tajikistan. Following the disappearance of central authority in the form of the Soviet Union, ethnic problems in those areas became more difficult to contain. They remain one of the most difficult intraregional problems facing countries in the region.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also accelerated the resurgence of Islam in Central Asia. While tolerating and offering modest support to Islam, whose roots run deep among the people of the region, Central Asian governments are nevertheless keen to prevent Islamic extremists from gaining a foothold by seizing upon people's anxieties about political stability and living standards.

Notable among the influences on domestic politics in Uzbekistan are "Makhalla"—local clans—and the antagonism that exists between them. The Samarkand clan, of which President Islam Karimov is a member, currently holds the reins of power, while the Fergana clan, which held power during the Soviet era, has been expelled from mainstream Uzbek politics. Extremist Fergana elements that fled to Tajikistan to escape the oppression of the Karimov government, continue to cast a shadow over relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Karimov has been closely monitoring the group, which reportedly receives support from the Taliban in Afghanistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which centered around the Islamic Revival Party. The Uzbek government, in seeking to keep Russian influence in the region to a minimum, wishes to see Tajikistan end its dependence on Russia in dealing with Islamic extremists. However, the Tajik government under Emomali Rakhmonov suspects Uzbekistan has been supporting Tajik antigovernment groups. It wishes to maintain close ties with Russia to contain Uzbekistan, a self-declared regional power that is exercising influence through control of its abundant energy supplies.

However, this year has seen several developments. The Uzbek and Tajik governments, for example, have agreed to cooperate in the fight against terrorists, Islamic extremists and drug smugglers, and have tentatively agreed to begin a new cooperative relationship on regional security. In addition, soon after the Rakhmonov government and the UTO formed a coalition government, the latter approved the agreements made between the two national governments over security issues, a move that is seen as a major turning point for domestic stability. As a result, Uzbek rebels have fallen silent now that they are looked upon as the enemy, even by the UTO, their erstwhile Islamic ally. Moreover, the Tajik government urged Uzbek rebels to return home or face being disarmed and expelled. The rebels' decision to take the former option led to the hostage crisis, since they needed a means of securing a safe passage.

The structure of political and security problems in Central Asia, which was characterized by the hostage crisis, is about more than individual governments' attempts to fend off a perceived Islamic threat. Muslim solidarity could, after all, crumble due to changes on the domestic political scene. Similarly, the cross-border ethnic problem could be pigeonholed by improvements in relations between states in the region.

The isolation and unsettling of Uzbek rebels, brought about by the formation of a coalition government in Tajikistan, is symbolic of this framework.

The fact remains, however, that neither country has a democratically elected government, and domestic affairs remain far from stable. Such a political environment, combined with discontent over the current despotic regimes, could open the door to Islamic extremists to expand their sphere of influence.

Clearly, instability in one country could all too easily lead to a political and security crisis throughout the region.

Differences between individual countries in their attitude toward Russia—an important element in the region's politics and security—also give cause for concern. Although Uzbekistan has sought, since the hostage crisis, to cooperate with Russia, it is still wary of its former political master. By contrast, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz have maintained a close relationship with Russia as a means of containing Uzbekistan.

Given the above, the security environment in Central Asia remains fragile, and there is little sign of a system emerging that is capable of overcoming that crucial weakness. But it is also true that some progress has been made in establishing a framework for regional cooperation in the areas of security and the economy. Shortly after the hostage crisis began, for example, the leaders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz, Russia and China met in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, and agreed to cooperate over regional security.

Yet there are signs that true regional cooperation will be an uphill struggle. In April 1999, for example, Uzbekistan withdrew as a signatory to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Security Treaty. In addition, it did not participate in a meeting held in Moscow at the end of October, at which the leaders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz, Belarus and Russia agreed to bolster joint anti-terrorism measures. A stable security regime in the region will depend on whether states can forge a relationship based on mutual trust, as well as faith in Russia and China. Multilateral and multiple dialogs are the best way to accomplish that goal. Still, much remains to be achieved before they can establish the kind of regional cooperation necessary to resolve other disputes.

Akiyama is research associate at HPI.

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Non-governmental organizations at the United Nations also gave their response to the Tokyo Forum report. On October 22, the U.N. Disarmament Week was organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament at the U.N. headquarters with the support of the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs and the U.N. Department for Public Information. The NGO Committee is a coalition of U.N.-affiliated organizations and institutions concerned with disarmament. The committee organized a panel discussion on the New Agenda Coalition, the Middle Power Initiative and the Tokyo Forum. Takeshi Kamiyama and Hirofumi Tosaki from the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and myself attended the discussion. (The JIIA, along with the Hiroshima Peace Institute, is a cosponsor of

the Tokyo Forum.)

Space prevents the contents of the discussion from being covered in detail. It should be mentioned, however, that one of the panelists, Jacqueline Cabasso, executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation, roundly criticized the report.

Cabasso described the report as "a step back" from the report of the Canberra Commission. She said the (Tokyo Forum) report placed too much emphasis on the non-proliferation dimension; that its measures for nuclear abolition were unclear; that it did not challenge the nuclear doctrine; that it did not deal with the issue of the nuclear umbrella; and that it lacked a sense of Japan's responsibility as the only country to have experienced the horrors of nuclear attacks.

No doubt supporters of the forum will, in

time, come up with powerful counter arguments of their own. It is worth noting, however, that criticisms such as those made by Cabasso provide useful lessons for those who value the report's recommendations.

In short, the following three conditions could be key variables through which people can reach their own conclusions about the contents of the report. The first concerns an understanding of the extent to which the report made clear "the absolute evil" of nuclear weapons; the second, of how strongly the report envisions a world free of nuclear weapons; and third, a decision on whether the report's support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime is indeed a retreat vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament.

It goes without saying that the members of the Tokyo Forum were in no doubt as to their ultimate objective, namely the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The path that they chose, however, was one that *first* examines the unraveling international landscape surrounding the nonproliferation regime and nuclear disarmament, and *then* suggests pragmatic measures to reverse the trend. The members' immediate aim was to present measures the international community would regard as feasible.

Cabasso said the report included no clear vision for nuclear disarmament. However, paragraph 29 of Part IV of the report states: "At a time of increasing nuclear dangers, the Tokyo Forum believes that actions are more important than words and pledges. Thus the Forum would place primary emphasis at this time on concrete steps to progressively reduce and eliminate nuclear dangers." This paragraph forms the basis of the Tokyo Forum's endeavors. In addition, paragraph 21 of the same part says: "A process of verifiable, phased reductions by all nuclear-armed states to one step short of zero is a goal on which advocates of abolition and deterrence might find common ground and from which all states would reap shared security gains." This paragraph clearly describes the vision of the Tokyo Forum. Furthermore, forum members pointed out in paragraph 1 of Part IV, and in paragraph 2 of Part V, that no other cities must be put through the devastation of nuclear explosions endured by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This fact must not be neglected.

Indeed, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said he hoped the international community would further examine the recommendations presented in the Tokyo Forum report so that the nonproliferation regime could be strengthened and moves toward nuclear disarmament accelerated. We desperately need to take concrete steps in this direction based on our shared objectives.

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Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

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Comments on the Tokyo Forum Report from Japan and abroad

"The Australian Government strongly endorses a number of the key recommendations. Like the Canberra Commission, I expect the Tokyo Forum report will make an important contribution to the debate on nonproliferation and disarmament issues."

Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a media release dated July 27, 1999

"Despite its ambitious profile, the Tokyo Forum missed a marvelous opportunity to launch a fair and just Japanese diplomacy that is based on a healthy framework free of the Cold War way of thinking."

Fumiaki Nishiwaki, associate professor at the Defense University of Japan, in the September 14 issue of "Sekai Shuho."

"The report failed to create the impact, vision and enthusiasm necessary to foster a sense of hope."

Hirofumi Umebayashi, executive director of Peace Depot, in the October 1 issue of "Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor."

"While nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous, it cannot be denied that the fear of nuclear weapons has forced humankind to exercise self-control with regard to war. The reported explanation offered by a member of the forum that the report means that (the nuclear-weapon states should reduce their nuclear arsenals) to within a step short of zero is nothing but an illusion."

Tomohisa Sakanaka, president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), in the September issue of "RIPS Newsletter."

"The dialogs and proposals among forum members, the Japanese government and NGOs have been by no means pointless. Many of the proposals made by NGOs were reflected in the report's key recommendations. But is not its stance of 'nuclear elimination through phased reductions' basically the same as the policy repeatedly proposed by the Japanese government? It cannot be denied that there is a gap between that aim and our call to initiate negotiations for a Nuclear Weapon Convention before the end of the 20th century. We can only anticipate the next forum will achieve more."

Sadao Kamata, president of the Nagasaki Peace Institute, in the October issue of "Gunshuku Mondai Shiryo."

"The report ends up lacking vision and proposes only incremental changes, the kind that might be acceptable to those who have no real desire to change the status quo."

David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, in comments carried on the foundation's Web site in September.

Newspaper and other articles

"Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century" Excerpts from the Tokyo Forum Report
Arms Control Today, Volume 29, No. 5, July/August 1999

The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [extracts]
Newsbrief published by PPNN; No. 47/3rd Quarter 1999

"U.S. Undercuts Arms Control Efforts, Global Panel Finds"
By *Barbara Crossette*, *New York Times*, August 4, 1999

"Nuclear experts urge Pak., India to sign CTBT"
The Hindu, August 6, 1999

"Experts urge India, Pak to sign NPT, CTBT"
The Indian Express, August 6, 1999

"The Threat from Nuclear Weapons Is Growing"
By *Yasushi Akashi*, *International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 1999

"Blighted Disarmament"
By *Brahma Chellaney*, *The Hindustan Times*, August 11, 1999

"Unrealistic and partisan"
By *Jasjit Singh*, *The Hindustan Times*, August 12, 1999

"An Obstacle-Ridden Path to Nuclear Disarmament"
By *Brahma Chellaney*, *International Herald Tribune*, August 21-22, 1999

A draft resolution proposed by Japan and adopted on December 1 at the U.N. General Assembly contains recommendations made by the Tokyo Forum in five of the resolution's 10 paragraphs, including the "...early commencement and conclusion of negotiations for START by Russia and the United States, and the continuation of the process beyond the START ..."

DIARY

September 1 ~ November 30, 1999

September 9-10

Masamichi Kamiya participates in a meeting, "Regional hearing for the ESCAP region in preparation for the millennium assembly," sponsored by the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), at the United Nations University in Tokyo.

September 10

Kazumi Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the 'nuclear umbrella,'" organized by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), in Tokyo.

September 11

Mizumoto acts as coordinator at a peace symposium, "Japan's security and nuclear umbrella," cosponsored by the Hiroshima Bar Association, the Hiroshima Prefectural Medical Association and the City of Hiroshima, at the medical association's hall.

September 22

Mizumoto gives an overview of the Tokyo Forum Report at a regular meeting of researchers specializing in security studies, held at the graduate school of Toyo Eiwa Women's University in Tokyo.

September 24

Nobumasa Akiyama and Kamiya participate in the Yomiuri International Forum, "The future of East Asian security—how to deal with crises on the Korean peninsula," cosponsored by the Tokyo Colloquium and the Yomiuri International Economic Society (YIES), at the Palace Hotel in Tokyo.

October 1

Mizumoto delivers a lecture on global nuclear issues and the peace movement in Hiroshima to foreign trainees of the Hiroshima International Cooperation Program, at the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

October 2-15

Akiyama visits Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to conduct research on the security environment in Central Asia.

Akiyama attends the 5th SPF-Issyk-Kul Forum, "Central Asia: in search of global linkage" in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan.

October 3

Mizumoto delivers a report, "The accomplishments of the Tokyo Forum Report and its remaining tasks," at a symposium titled "The challenge to nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear abolition," cosponsored by the Nagasaki Peace Institute and Nagasaki Institute for Peace Culture, held at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.

October 5

Mizumoto, Kamiya and Akiko Naono discuss peace and related issues with 27 U.N. Disarmament Fellows at the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.

October 18-21

Akiyama acts as program coordinator at the 10th South Pacific Ocean seminar, "The Internet: information technology for the efficient delivery and enhancement of the learning environment," sponsored by the Association for the Communication of Transcultural Studies (ACT) in Honolulu.

October 19-25

Kamiya participates in "Disarmament Week 1999 at the United Nations," sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament in cooperation with the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs and the U.N. Department for Public Information. He also visits the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Tokyo Forum Report now available in booklet form

A handy booklet version of the Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament was published recently by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a cosponsor of the forum.

The booklet, titled "Facing nuclear dangers: an action plan for the 21st century," is available either in English, the language used in the original report, or in English accompanied by a Japanese translation.

The English version contains a preface, profiles of forum members and the five sections comprising the report. The bilingual edition contains comments in Japanese on the workings of the forum and the contents of the report.

The English edition, 1,700 copies of which have been printed, costs 400 yen per copy, and the bilingual edition (2,500 copies) is 1,000 yen per copy.

People wishing to buy a copy of the English edition should call JIIA at (03-3503-7262). Orders for the bilingual version can be made at bookstores. The booklet is available only in Japan.

October 21

Mizumoto and Naono take part in a seminar, "Hiroshima and Israel—towards the 21st century," with the Fourth Delegation to Japan of the Israel-Japan Intellectual Exchange Program, sponsored by the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE).

October 25

Akiyama attends a study group workshop on nuclear energy, held at the Institute of Applied Energy.

October 28

Mizumoto attends the "Forum on new thinking on security issues: Japan as a middle power," held at and sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation.

October 28

Akiyama attends a workshop on Central Asia and Kavkaz at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

November 2

Mizumoto attends the 19th Afternoon Seminar, "Global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation: crisis or collapse?" sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation.

November 5

A delegation comprising Akiyama, Robert McNamara, former U.S. defense secretary; Gen. (Ret.) Lee Butler of the U.S. Strategic Command; Robert Green, a former British Royal Navy commander; and members of The Middle Power Initiative visits the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukushima Nukaga and Tsutomu Kawara, director general of the Defense Agency.

November 10

Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the 'nuclear umbrella,'" organized by NIRA, in Tokyo.

November 11

Akiyama makes a speech, "Recent trends in nuclear disarmament," at the Gotenba Rotary, Shizuoka Prefecture.

November 18

Mizumoto attends the 22nd Afternoon Seminar, "The 1999 coup d'etat in Pakistan: a political and economic analysis," sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation.

November 19

Kamiya and Prof. Emeritus John D. Montgomery of Harvard University, who participated in Hiroshima's reconstruction right after WWII, discuss peace and related issues at Hiroshima International Conference Hall.

November 19

Akiyama attends a Strategic Studies Fellowship Program seminar, "The Strategy of the U.S. Navy after the Cold War," sponsored by the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS).

— Visitors to HPI —

September 17

Prof. Lai Jeh-hang of the Institute of History and dean of the College of Liberal Arts, both at the National Central University in Taiwan

October 6

Marianne Peron, visiting research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs

November 30

Arun Gandhi, founder and director of the M.K. Gandhi Nonviolence Institute in Memphis, Tennessee

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS is a newsletter published four times a year by the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

Readers are encouraged to submit comments or articles for inclusion in HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS.

Articles should contain a maximum of 1,200 words, and may be edited for length and clarity. Submissions can be sent by fax, mail or, preferably, by e-mail. They should be accompanied by the writer's name, address, telephone number and profession. Unfortunately, submissions cannot be returned.

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